A couple of weeks ago, our IT 在庫／株 分析家, Melanie Hollands, （機の）カム upon an article called “The 在庫／株 Market” written by 示す Cuban on his weblog. Cuban sold Broadcast.com to Yahoo at the 高さ of the 泡 in 1999 for $2 billion and now owns the Dallas 無所属の政治家s. The article is a 広大な／多数の／重要な account of his experiences as a 科学（工学）技術 entrepreneur in the market during the 1980s and 1990s, and a blunt look at the ponzi 計画／陰謀 that the 株式市場 has become.
“I like Cuban’s style of 令状ing — blunt, to the point; he calls it like he sees it with no frills or window dressing,” Hollands said. “During this time, and based on my own vantage point on the Street, I can only say how 権利 I believe his 観察s and 結論s are.”
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The 在庫／株 Market
By 示す Cuban
I get asked all the time to 令状 a 調書をとる／予約する about 商売／仕事 and my approach to it. I’m not ready to take that leap yet, but along the way, when I find a 調書をとる／予約する that really impresses me, I try to help it find an audience. In this 事例／患者, it wasn’t long ago I read my now favorite 調書をとる／予約する about the 株式市場 called “The Number” by Alex Berenson. I liked it so much, I volunteered to 令状 the 今後 for the paperback 版.
Here is the 今後 I wrote for “The Number.” I recommend that anyone with an 利益／興味 in the market jump at the chance to buy it.
In 1990, I sold my company, MicroSolutions — which 専攻するd in what at the time was the 比較して new 商売／仕事 of helping companies 網状組織 their computer 器具／備品 — to CompuServe. After 税金s, I walked away with about $2 million. That was going to be my nest egg, and my goal was to 保護する it at all costs, and grow it wisely.
I 始める，決める about interviewing stockbrokers and settled upon a 仲買人 from Goldman Sachs, Raleigh Ralls. Raleigh was in his late 20s, and 比較して new to Goldman. But we 攻撃する，衝突する it off very 井戸／弁護士席 and I 信用d him. As we planned my 財政上の 未来, I made it （疑いを）晴らす that I 手配中の，お尋ね者 my nest egg to be 投資するd not like I was 30 years old, but as if I were 60 years old. I was a 未亡人s and 孤児s 投資家.
Over the next year I stuck to my 計画（する）. I 信用d Raleigh, and he put me in 社債s, （株主への）配当-支払う／賃金ing 公共事業（料金）／有用性s and blue 半導体素子s, just as I asked.
During that year, Raleigh began asking me a lot of questions about 科学（工学）技術. Because of my experience at MicroSolutions, I knew the 製品s and companies that were hot. Synoptics, Wellfleet, NetWorth, Lotus, Novell, and others. I knew which had 製品s that worked, didn’t work, were selling or not. How these companies were marketed, and whether or not they were or would be successful.
I couldn’t believe that I would have an advantage in the market. After all, I had read “A 無作為の Walk 負かす／撃墜する 塀で囲む Street” in college. I truly thought that the markets were efficient, that any 利用できる knowledge about a company was already 反映するd in its 在庫／株 price. Yet I saw Raleigh using the （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状） I gave him to make money for his （弁護士の）依頼人s. He finally broke me 負かす／撃墜する to start using this （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状） to my advantage to make some money in the market. Finally after more than a year, I relented. I was ready to 貿易（する）.
Notice I didn’t use the word 投資する. I wasn’t an 投資家. I just 手配中の，お尋ね者 to make money. The 推論する／理由 I was ready to try was that it was patently obvious that the market wasn’t efficient. Someone like me with 産業 knowledge had an advantage. My knowledge could be used profitably. As we got ready to start, I asked Raleigh if he had any words of 知恵 that I should remember. His 返答 was simple. “Get Long, Get Loud.”
Get long, get loud
As we started buying and selling 科学（工学）技術 在庫／株s, most of which were in the 地元の area 網状組織ing field that I had 専攻するd in at MicroSolutions, Raleigh put me on the phone with 分析家s, money 経営者／支配人s, individual 投資家s, reporters, anyone with money or 影響（力） who 手配中の，お尋ね者 to talk 科学（工学）技術 and 在庫／株s.
We talked about 記念品 （犯罪の）一味 topologies that didn’t work on 10BaseT. We talked about what companies were stuffing channels — selling more 器具／備品 to their distributors than the distributors really needed to 会合，会う the 小売 需要・要求する. We talked about who was winning, and who was losing. We talked about things that really 量d to the things you would hear if you …に出席するd any 産業 貿易（する） show パネル盤. Yet after hanging up the phone with these people, I would watch 在庫／株s move up and 負かす／撃墜する. Of course as the 在庫／株s moved, the number of people wanting to talk to me grew.
I remember buying 在庫／株 in a Canadian company called Gandalf 科学（工学）技術s in the 早期に ’90s. Gandalf made Ethernet 橋（渡しをする）s that 許すd 商売／仕事s and homes to connect to the Internet and each other 経由で high-速度(を上げる） 数字表示式の phone lines called ISDN.
I had bought one for my house and liked the 製品, and I’d talked to other people who’d used it. They had decent results, nothing みごたえのある, but good enough. I had no idea Gandalf was even a public company until a friend of Raleigh’s asked me about it. What did I think about Gandalf 科学（工学）技術s? It was 貿易（する）ing at the time at about a buck a 株. It was a decent company, I said. It had 競争, but the market was new and they had as much chance as anyone to 後継する. Sure, I’ll buy some, and I would be happy to answer any questions about the 科学（工学）技術. The market size, the 競争, the growth 率s. Whatever I knew, I would tell.
I bought the 在庫／株, I answered the questions, and I watched Gandalf climb from a dollar to about $20 a 株 over the next months.
At a dollar, I could make an argument that Gandalf could be attractive. Its market was growing, and compared to the 競争, it was reasonably valued on a price-sales or price-収入s basis. But at $20, the company’s market value was の近くに to $1 billion — which in those days was real money. The 状況／情勢 was crazy. People were buying the 在庫／株 because other people were buying the 在庫／株.
To 追加する to the 容積／容量, a 中央の-sized 投資 bank that 専攻するd in 科学（工学）技術 companies （機の）カム out with a buy 率ing on Gandalf. They 繰り返し言うd all the marketing mishmash that was fun to talk about when the 在庫／株 was a dollar. The ISDN market was 爆発するing. The 製品 was good. Gandalf was 追加するing distributors. If they only 持続するd X 百分率 of the market, they would grow to some big number. Their competitors were 貿易（する）ing at 抱擁する market caps, so this company looks cheap. Et cetera, et cetera.
The bank made up 予測（する）s 明確に表すing 歳入 numbers at monstrous growth 率s that at some point in the 未来 led to 利益（をあげる）s. Unfortunately, the bank couldn’t attract enough new money to the 在庫／株 to 支える its price. It didn’t have enough 仲買人s to shout out the marketing spiel to entice enough new 買い手s to 支払う／賃金 the old 買い手s. The hope の中で the “sophisticated 買い手s” was that one bank 選ぶing up ニュース報道 would lead to others doing the same. It didn’t happen. No other big 投資 banks published 報告（する）／憶測s on the 在庫／株. The 容積／容量 turned 負かす／撃墜する.
So I did the only smart thing. I sold my 在庫／株, and I shorted it その上. Then I told the same people who asked me why I was buying the 在庫／株 that I had shorted the 在庫／株. Over the next months, the 在庫／株 sank into oblivion. In 1997, Gandalf とじ込み／提出するd for 破産. Its 株 were 取り消すd — wiped out — a few months later. I wish I could take credit for the 在庫／株 going up, and going 負かす／撃墜する. I can’t. If the company had 成し遂げるd 井戸／弁護士席, who knows what the 在庫／株 would have done?
But the entire experience taught me やめる a bit about how the market 作品. For years on end a company’s price can have いっそう少なく to do with a company’s real prospects than with the excitement it and its 支持者s are able to 生成する の中で 投資家s. That lesson was 増強するd as I saw the Gandalf experience repeated with many different 在庫／株s over the next 10 years. 仲買人s and 銀行業者s market and sell 在庫／株s. Unless 需要・要求する can be 製造（する）d, the 在庫／株 will 拒絶する／低下する.
In July of 1998, my partner Todd Wagner and I took our company, Broadcast.com, public with Morgan Stanley. Broadcast.com used 音声部の and ビデオ streaming to enable companies to communicate live with 顧客s, 従業員s, vendors, anyone with a PC. We 設立するd Broadcast.com in 1995, and we were 井戸／弁護士席 on our way to 存在 profitable. Still, we never thought we would go public so quickly. But this was the Internet 時代, and the 需要・要求する for Internet 在庫／株s was starting to 爆発する. So 公然と 貿易（する）d we would become, and Morgan Stanley would shepherd us.
Part of the 過程 of taking a new company public is something called a road show. The road show is just that. A company getting ready to sell 株 visits the big 相互の 基金s, hedge 基金s, 年金 基金s — anyone who can buy millions of dollars of 在庫／株 in a 選び出す／独身 order. It’s a sales 小旅行する. Seven days, 63 贈呈s. We often discussed turning up the 容積／容量 on the 在庫／株. It was the ultimate “Get Loud.” Call it Stockapalooza.
事前の to the road show, we put together an amazing 贈呈. We 雇うd 顧問s to help us. We practiced and practiced. We argued about what we should and shouldn’t say. We had Morgan Stanley and others ask us every possible question they could think of so we wouldn’t look stupid when we sat in 前線 of these savvy 投資家s.
Savvy 投資家s? I was shocked. Of the 63 companies and 400-加える 関係者s we visited, I would be 誇張するing if I said we got 10 good questions about our 商売／仕事 and how it worked. The 広大な 大多数 of people in the 会合s had no 手がかり（を与える） who we were or what we did. They just knew that there were a lot of people talking about the company and they should be there.
The 欠如（する） of knowledge at the 会合s got to be such a joke between Todd and I that we used to purposely mess up to see if anyone noticed. Or we would have pet lines that we would （不足などを）補う to 割れ目 each other up. Did we 廃虚 our chance for the IPO? Was our 製品 so 複雑にするd that no one got it and as a result no one bought the 在庫／株? Hell, no. They might not have had a 手がかり（を与える）, but that didn’t stop them from buying the 在庫／株. We batted 1.000. Every 選び出す／独身 投資家 we talked to placed the 最大限 order allowable for the 在庫／株.
On July 18, 1998, Broadcast.com went public as BCST, 定価つきの at $18 a 株. It の近くにd at $62.75, a 伸び（る） of almost 250 パーセント, which at the time was the largest one-day rise of a new 申し込む／申し出ing in the history of the 株式市場. The same 相互の 基金 経営者／支配人s who were 完全に clueless about our company placed multimillion orders for our 在庫／株. Multimillion dollar orders using YOUR MONEY.
If the value of a 在庫／株 is what people will 支払う／賃金 for it, then Broadcast.com was 公正に／かなり valued. We were able to work with Morgan Stanley to create 容積／容量 around the 在庫／株. 容積／容量 creates 需要・要求する. 在庫／株s don’t go up because companies do 井戸／弁護士席 or do 貧しく. 在庫／株s go up and 負かす／撃墜する depending on 供給（する） and 需要・要求する. If a 在庫／株 is marketed 井戸／弁護士席 enough to create more 需要・要求する from 買い手s than there are 販売人s, the 在庫／株 will go up. What about 根底となるs? 根底となるs is a word invented by 販売人s to find 買い手s.
Price-収入s 割合s, price-sales, the 現在の value of 未来 cash flows — 選ぶ one. 根底となるs are 単に metrics created to help stockbrokers sell 在庫／株s and to give 買い手s 安心 when buying 在庫／株s. Even how 利益（をあげる）s are calculated is manipulated to give 信用／信任 to 買い手s.
I get asked every day to 投資する in 私的な companies. I always ask the same couple questions. How soon till I get my money 支援する, and how much cash can I make from the 投資? I never ask what the PE 割合 will be, what the price to sales 割合 will be. Most 私的な 投資家s are the same way. Heck, in Junior 業績／成就 we were taught to return money to our 投資家s. For some 推論する／理由, as Alex points out in “The Number,” 買い手s of 在庫／株s have lost sight of the value of companies 支払う／賃金ing them cash for their 投資. In today’s markets, cash isn’t earned by 持つ／拘留するing a company and collecting （株主への）配当s. It’s earned by 納得させるing someone to buy your 在庫／株 from you.
If you really think of it, when a 在庫／株 doesn’t 支払う／賃金 （株主への）配当s, there really isn’t a whole lot of difference between a 株 of 在庫／株 and a baseball card.
If you put your Mickey Mantle 新人 card on your desk, and a 株 of your favorite 非，不，無-（株主への）配当 支払う／賃金ing 在庫／株 next to it, and let it sit there for 20 years. After 20 years you would still just have two pieces of paper sitting on your desk.
The difference in value would come from how 井戸／弁護士席 they were marketed. If there were millions of stockbrokers selling baseball cards, if there were 財政上の television channels 献身的な to covering the value of baseball cards with a ticker of baseball card prices streaming at the 底（に届く）, if the 基金 産業 spent billions to tell you to buy and 持つ／拘留する baseball cards, I am willing to bet we would talk about the 根底となるs of baseball cards instead of 在庫／株s.
I know that sounds crazy, but the 株式市場 has gone from a place where 投資家s 現実に own part of a company and have a say in their 管理／経営, to a market designed to 濃厚にする insiders by 許すing them to sell 株 they buy cheaply through 選択s. Companies continuously 問題／発行する new 株 to their 経営者／支配人s without asking their 存在するing 株主s. Those 経営者／支配人s then 漏れる that 在庫／株 to the market a little at a time. It’s 制限のない 薄めること of 存在するing 株主s’ 火刑／賭けるs, death by a thousand dilutive 削減（する）s. If that isn’t a scam, I don’t know what is. Individual 株主s have nothing but the chance to sell it to the next sucker. A 相互の 基金 buys 1 million 株 of a company with your and your coworkers’ money. You own 1 パーセント of the company. Six weeks later you own いっそう少なく, and all that money went to insiders, not to the company. And no one asked your 許可, and you didn’t know you got diluted or by how much till 90 days after the fact — if that soon.
When Broadcast.com went public, we raised a lot of money that certainly helped us grow as a company. But once you get past the raising 資本／首都 part of the market, the 株式市場 becomes not only inefficient, but as の近くに to a Ponzi 計画／陰謀 as you can get.
As a public company, we got calls every day from people who owned Broadcast.com 在庫／株 or had bought it for their 基金s. They didn’t call because they were 混乱させるd during our road show, were too embarrassed to ask questions and 手配中の，お尋ね者 to get more （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状）. They called because they 手配中の，お尋ね者 to know if the “根底となるs” — the marketing points — they had heard before were 改善するing. And the most important 根底となる was “The Number,” our 年４回の 収入s (or in our 事例／患者, a loss). Once we went public, Morgan Stanley published a 報告（する）／憶測 on our company, as did several other 会社／堅いs. They all 事業／計画（する）d our 年４回の sales and 収入s. Would we （警官の）巡回区域，受持ち区域 The Number?
Of course, by 法律, we were not 許すd to say anything. That didn’t stop people from asking. They needed us to （警官の）巡回区域，受持ち区域 the 予測（する）. They knew if we （警官の）巡回区域，受持ち区域 The Number the 容積／容量 on the 在庫／株 would go up. 仲買人s would tell their （弁護士の）依頼人s about it. The 塀で囲む Street 定期刊行物 would 令状 about it. CNBC would shout the good news to day 仲買人s and 投資 banks that watched their 網状組織 all day long. All the 容積／容量 would 運動 up the 在庫／株 price.
Unfortunately, patience is not a virtue on 塀で囲む Street. Every day, 大臣の地位s are valued by at の近くにing price. If the value of your 基金 isn’t keeping up with the 索引s or your 競争, the new money coming in the market won’t come to you. It just wasn’t feasible for these 投資家s to wait till the number was 報告（する）／憶測d by companies each ４半期/4分の1. The 容積／容量 had to be on the 在庫／株s in you 基金. To keep the 容積／容量 about a 在庫／株 up, and the 需要・要求する for the 在庫／株 増加するing, you needed to have good news to tell.
容積／容量, The Number, whisper numbers, insiders 認めるing themselves millions and millions of 選択s — these are the games that 塀で囲む Street plays to keep on 濃厚にするing themselves at the expense of the public. I know this. I have tried to tell people to be careful before they turned over their life 貯金 and their 財政上の 未来 to someone whose first 職業 is to keep their 職業, not make you money.
Till I read “The Number” by Alex Berenson, I never had a 調書をとる／予約する that explained how the market truly worked that I could tell my friends, family and 知識s to read. I never had a 調書をとる／予約する that would truly 警告する them that the market was not as fair and honest as 相互の 基金 and 仲買業 商業のs made them out to be. I may be a cynic when it comes to the 株式市場, but I am an 知らせるd cynic, and that has helped me make some very, very profitable 決定／判定勝ち（する）s in the market.
If you are considering 投資するing in the market, any part of it, or if you are considering giving your hard-earned money over to someone else to manage, please, please read “The Number” first.
This article was reprinted by 許可 of the author.