一時期／支部 22
NOTES ON THE TRADE CYCLE
Since we （人命などを）奪う，主張する to have shown in the 先行する 一時期／支部s what
決定するs the 容積／容量 of 雇用 at any time, it follows, if
we are 権利, that our theory must be 有能な of explaining the
phenomena of the 貿易（する） cycle.
If we 診察する the 詳細（に述べる）s of any actual instance of the 貿易（する）
cycle, we shall find that it is 高度に コンビナート／複合体 and that every
element in our 分析 will be 要求するd for its 完全にする
explanation. In particular we shall find that fluctuations in the
propensity to 消費する, in the 明言する／公表する of liquidity-preference, and
in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 have all played a part. But
I 示唆する that the 必須の character of the 貿易（する） cycle and,
特に, the regularity of time-sequence and of duration which
正当化するs us in calling it a cycle, is おもに 予定 to the
way in which the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 fluctuates. The
貿易（する） cycle is best regarded, I think, as 存在 occasioned by a
cyclical change in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都, though
複雑にするd and often 悪化させるd by associated changes in the
other 重要な short-period variables of the 経済的な system.
To develop this 論題／論文 would 占領する a 調書をとる／予約する rather than a 一時期／支部,
and would 要求する a の近くに examination of facts. But the に引き続いて
short 公式文書，認めるs will be 十分な to 示す the line of
調査 which our 先行する theory 示唆するs.
I
By a cyclical movement we mean that as the system
進歩s in, e.g. the 上向き direction, the 軍隊s propelling it 上向きs at first gather 軍隊 and have a
cumulative 影響 on one another but 徐々に lose their
strength until at a 確かな point they tend to be 取って代わるd by
軍隊s operating in the opposite direction; which in turn gather
軍隊 for a time and accentuate one another, until they too,
having reached their 最大限 開発, 病弱な and give place to
their opposite. We do not, however, 単に mean by a cyclical movement
that 上向き and downward 傾向s, once started, do not 固執する
for ever in the same direction but are 最終的に 逆転するd. We
mean also that there is some recognisable degree of regularity in
the time-sequence and duration of the 上向き and downward
movements.
There is, however, another characteristic of what we call the
貿易（する） cycle which our explanation must cover if it is to be
適する; すなわち, the 現象 of the 危機ｾthe fact that the substitution of a
downward for an 上向き 傾向 often takes place suddenly and
violently, 反して there is, as a 支配する, no such sharp
turning-point when an 上向き is 代用品，人d for a downward
傾向.
Any fluctuation in 投資 not 相殺する by a
corresponding change in the propensity to 消費する will, of
course, result in a fluctuation in 雇用. Since, therefore,
the 容積／容量 of 投資 is 支配する to 高度に コンビナート／複合体 影響（力）s,
it is 高度に improbable that all fluctuations either in
投資 itself or in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 will
be of a cyclical character. One special 事例／患者, in particular,
すなわち, that which is associated with 農業の fluctuations,
will be 分かれて considered in a later section of this 一時期／支部.
I 示唆する, however, that there are 確かな 限定された 推論する／理由s why,
in the 事例／患者 of a typical 産業の 貿易（する） cycle in the
nineteenth-century 環境, fluctuations in the ごくわずかの
efficiency of 資本／首都 should have had cyclical 特徴.
These 推論する／理由s are by no means unfamiliar either in themselves or
as explanations of the 貿易（する） cycle. My only 目的 here is to link them up with the
先行する theory.
II
I can best introduce what I have to say by beginning with the
later 行う／開催する／段階s of the にわか景気 and the onset of the '危機'.
We have seen above that the ごくわずかの efficiency of
資本／首都 depends, not only on the 存在するing 豊富 or scarcity of
資本／首都-goods and the 現在の cost of 生産／産物 of
資本／首都-goods, but also on 現在の 期待s as to the 未来
産する／生じる of 資本／首都-goods. In the 事例／患者 of 持続する 資産s it is,
therefore, natural and reasonable that 期待s of the 未来
should play a 支配的な part in 決定するing the 規模 on which new
投資 is みなすd advisable. But, as we have seen, the basis
for such 期待s is very 不安定な. 存在 based on 転換ing
and unreliable 証拠, they are 支配する to sudden and violent
changes.
Now, we have been accustomed in explaining the '危機' to lay
強調する／ストレス on the rising 傾向 of the 率 of 利益／興味 under the
影響（力） of the 増加するd 需要・要求する for money both for 貿易（する） and
思索的な 目的s. At times this factor may certainly play an
悪化させるing and, occasionally perhaps, an 始めるing part. But I
示唆する that a more typical, and often the predominant,
explanation of the 危機 is, not まず第一に／本来 a rise in the 率 of
利益／興味, but a sudden 崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの efficiency of
資本／首都.
The later 行う／開催する／段階s of the にわか景気 are characterised by 楽観的な
期待s as to the 未来 産する／生じる of 資本／首都-goods 十分に
strong to 相殺する their growing 豊富 and their rising costs
of 生産／産物 and, probably, a rise in the 率 of 利益／興味 also.
It is of the nature of organised 投資 markets, under the 影響（力） of
purchasers 大部分は ignorant of what they are buying and of
相場師s who are more 関心d with 予測（する）ing the next
転換 of market 感情 than with a reasonable 見積（る） of the
未来 産する／生じる of 資本／首都-資産s, that, when disillusion 落ちるs upon
an over-楽観的な and over-bought market, it should 落ちる with
sudden and even 壊滅的な 軍隊.
Nloreover, the 狼狽 and 不確定 as to the 未来 which
…を伴ってs a 崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都
自然に precipitates a sharp 増加する in liquidity-preferenceｾand hence a rise in the 率 of 利益／興味.
Thus the fact that a 崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの efficiency of
資本／首都 tends to be associated with a rise in the 率 of
利益／興味 may 本気で 悪化させる the 拒絶する／低下する in 投資. But
the essence of the 状況／情勢 is to be 設立する, にもかかわらず, in the
崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都, 特に in
the 事例／患者 of those types of 資本／首都 which have been 与える／捧げるing
most to the previous 段階 of 激しい new 投資.
Liquidity-preference, except those manifestations of it which are
associated with 増加するing 貿易（する） and 憶測, does not
増加する until after the 崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの
efficiency of 資本／首都.
It is this, indeed, which （判決などを）下すs the 低迷 so intractable.
Later on, a 拒絶する／低下する in the 率 of 利益／興味 will be a 広大な／多数の／重要な 援助（する）
to 回復 and, probably, a necessary 条件 of it. But, for
the moment, the 崩壊（する） in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都
may be so 完全にする that no practicable 削減 in the 率 of
利益／興味 will be enough. If a 削減 in the 率 of 利益／興味
was 有能な of 証明するing an 効果的な 治療（薬） by itself; it might be
possible to 達成する a 回復 without the elapse of any
かなりの interval of time and by means more or いっそう少なく 直接／まっすぐに
under the 支配（する）／統制する of the 通貨の 当局. But, in fact, this is not usually the 事例／患者; and it
is not so 平易な to 生き返らせる the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都,
決定するd, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient
psychology of the 商売／仕事 world. It is the return of 信用／信任,
to speak in ordinary language, which is so insusceptible to
支配（する）／統制する in an economy of individualistic capitalism. This is the
面 of the 低迷 which 銀行業者s and 商売／仕事 men have been
権利 in 強調ing, and which the 経済学者s who have put their
約束 in a '純粋に 通貨の' 治療（薬） have underestimated.
This brings me to my point. The explanation of the
time-element in the 貿易（する） cycle, of the fact that an interval of
time of a particular order of magnitude must usually elapse
before 回復 begins, is to be sought in the 影響（力）s which
治める／統治する the 回復 of the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都. There
are 推論する／理由s, given firstly by the length of life of 持続する
資産s in relation to the normal 率 of growth in a given 時代,
and secondly by the carrying-costs of 黒字／過剰 在庫／株s, why the
duration of the downward movement should have an order of
magnitude which is not fortuitous, which does not fluctuate
between, say, one year this time and ten years next time, but
which shows some regularity of habit between, let us say, three
and five years.
Let us recur to what happens at the 危機. So long as the
にわか景気 was continuing, much of the new 投資 showed a not
unsatisfactory 現在の 産する／生じる. The disillusion comes because
疑問s suddenly arise 関心ing the reliability of the
見込みのある 産する／生じる, perhaps because the 現在の 産する／生じる shows 調印するs
of 落ちるing off, as the 在庫／株 of newly produced 持続する goods
刻々と 増加するs. If 現在の costs of 生産／産物 are thought to
be higher than they will be later on, that will be a その上の
推論する／理由 for a 落ちる in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都. Once
疑問 begins it spreads 速く. Thus at the 手始め of the 低迷
there is probably much 資本／首都 of which the ごくわずかの efficiency
has become ごくわずかの or even 消極的な. But the interval of time, which will have to elapse
before the 不足 of 資本／首都 through use, decay and
obsolescence 原因（となる）s a 十分に obvious scarcity to 増加する
the ごくわずかの efficiency, may be a somewhat stable 機能（する）／行事 of the
普通の／平均（する） durability of 資本／首都 in a given 時代. If the
特徴 of the 時代 転換, the 基準 time-interval
will change. If, for example, we pass from a period of 増加するing
全住民 into one of 拒絶する／低下するing 全住民, the characteristic
段階 of the cycle will be lengthened. But we have in the above a
相当な 推論する／理由 why the duration of the 低迷 should have a
限定された 関係 to the length of life of 持続する 資産s and
to the normal 率 of growth in a given 時代.
The second stable time-factor is 予定 to the carrying-costs of
黒字／過剰 在庫／株s which 軍隊 their absorption within a 確かな
period, neither very short nor very long. The sudden 停止 of
new 投資 after the 危機 will probably lead to an
accumulation of 黒字／過剰 在庫／株s of unfinished goods. The
carrying-costs of these 在庫／株s will seldom be いっそう少なく than 10 per
cent. per 年. Thus the 落ちる in their price needs to be
十分な to bring about a 制限 which 供給するs for their
absorption within a period of; say, three to five years at the
outside. Now the 過程 of 吸収するing the 在庫／株s 代表するs
消極的な 投資, which is a その上の deterrent to 雇用;
and, when it is over, a manifest 救済 will be experienced.
Moreover, the 削減 in working 資本／首都, which is やむを得ず
attendant on the 拒絶する／低下する in 生産（高） on the downward 段階,
代表するs a その上の element of disinvestment, which may be
large; and, once the 後退，不況 has begun, this 発揮するs a strong
cumulative 影響（力） in the downward direction. In the earliest
段階 of a typical 低迷 there will probably be an 投資 in
増加するing 在庫／株s which helps to 相殺する disinvestment in
working-資本／首都; in the next 段階 there may be a short period of
disinvestment both in 在庫／株s and in working-資本／首都; after the lowest point has been passed there is
likely to be a その上の disinvestment in 在庫／株s which 部分的に／不公平に
相殺するs reinvestment in working-資本／首都; and, finally, after the
回復 is 井戸／弁護士席 on its way, both factors will be 同時に
favourable to 投資. It is against this background that the
付加 and superimposed 影響s of fluctuations of 投資
in 持続する goods must be 診察するd. When a 拒絶する／低下する in this type of
投資 has 始める，決める a cyclical fluctuation in 動議 there will be
little 激励 to a 回復 in such 投資 until the
cycle has partly run its course.
Unfortunately a serious 落ちる in the ごくわずかの efficiency of
資本／首都 also tends to 影響する／感情 逆に the propensity to 消費する.
For it 伴う／関わるs a 厳しい 拒絶する／低下する in the market value of 在庫／株
交流 公正，普通株主権s. Now, on the class who take an active 利益／興味
in their 在庫／株 交流 投資s, 特に if they are
雇うing borrowed 基金s, this 自然に 発揮するs a very depressing
影響（力）. These people are, perhaps, even more 影響（力）d in
their 準備完了 to spend by rises and 落ちるs in the value of their
投資s than by the 明言する／公表する of their incomes. With a
'在庫／株-minded' public as in the 部隊d 明言する／公表するs to-day, a rising
在庫／株-market may be an almost 必須の 条件 of a
満足な propensity to 消費する; and this circumstance,
一般に overlooked until lately, 明白に serves to 悪化させる
still その上の the depressing 影響 of a 拒絶する／低下する in the ごくわずかの
efficiency of 資本／首都.
When once the 回復 has been started, the manner in which
it 料金d on itself and cumulates is obvious. But during the
downward 段階, when both 直す／買収する，八百長をするd 資本／首都 and 在庫／株s of 構成要素s
are for the time 存在 redundant and working-資本／首都 is 存在
減ずるd, the schedule of the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 may
落ちる so low that it can scarcely be 訂正するd, so as to 安全な・保証する a 満足な 率 of new 投資, by any
practicable 削減 in the 率 of 利益／興味. Thus with markets
organised and 影響（力）d as they are at 現在の, the market
estimation of the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 may 苦しむ such
enormously wide fluctuations that it cannot be 十分に
相殺する by corresponding fluctuations in the 率 of 利益／興味.
Moreover, the corresponding movements in the 在庫／株-market may, as
we have seen above, depress the propensity to 消費する just wlaen
it is most needed. In 条件s of laissez-faire the
avoidance of wide fluctuations in 雇用 may, therefore,
証明する impossible without a far-reaching change in the psychology
of 投資 markets such as there is no 推論する／理由 to 推定する／予想する. I
結論する that the 義務 of ordering the 現在の 容積／容量 of
投資 cannot 安全に be left in 私的な 手渡すs.
III
The 先行する 分析 may appear to be in 順応／服従 with the
見解（をとる） of those who 持つ／拘留する that over-投資 is the characteristic
of the にわか景気, that the avoidance of this over-投資 is the
only possible 治療（薬） for the 続いて起こるing 低迷, and that, whilst for
the 推論する／理由s given above the 低迷 cannot be 妨げるd by a low
率 of 利益／興味, にもかかわらず the にわか景気 can be 避けるd by a high
率 of 利益／興味. There is, indeed, 軍隊 in the argument that a
high 率 of 利益／興味 is much more 効果的な against a にわか景気 than
a low 率 of 利益／興味 against a 低迷.
To infer these 結論s from the above would, however,
misinterpret my 分析; and would, によれば my way of
thinking, 伴う／関わる serious error. For the 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 over-投資 is
あいまいな. It may 言及する to 投資s which are 運命にあるd to
disappoint the 期待s which 誘発するd them or for which
there is no use in 条件s of 厳しい 失業, or it may
示す a 明言する／公表する of 事件／事情／状勢s where every 肉親，親類d of 資本／首都-goods is so abundant that there is no new 投資 which is
推定する／予想するd, even in 条件s of 十分な 雇用, to earn in the
course of its life more than its 交替／補充 cost. It is only the
latter 明言する／公表する of 事件／事情／状勢s which is one of over-投資, 厳密に
speaking, in the sense that any その上の 投資 would be a
sheer waste of 資源s.
Moreover, even if over-投資 in this sense was a normal
characteristic of the にわか景気, the 治療（薬） would not 嘘（をつく） in clapping
on a high 率 of 利益／興味 which would probably 阻止する some useful
投資s and might その上の 減らす the propensity to 消費する,
but in taking 激烈な steps, by redistributing incomes or
さもなければ, to 刺激する the propensity to 消費する.
によれば my 分析, however, it is only in the former
sense that the にわか景気 can be said to be characterised by
over-投資. The 状況／情勢, which I am 示すing as typical,
is not one in which 資本／首都 is so abundant that the community as
a whole has no reasonable use for any more, but where 投資
is 存在 made in 条件s which are 安定性のない and cannot 耐える,
because it is 誘発するd by 期待s which are 運命にあるd to
失望.
It may, of course, be the 事例／患者ｾindeed
it is likely to beｾthat the illusions
of the にわか景気 原因（となる） particular types of 資本／首都-資産s to be
produced in such 過度の 豊富 that some part of the 生産（高）
is, on any criterion, a waste of 資源s;ｾwhich
いつかs happens, we may 追加する, even when there is no にわか景気. It
leads, that is to say, to misdirected 投資. But over
and above this it is an 必須の characteristic of the にわか景気 that
投資s which will in fact 産する／生じる, say, 2 per cent in
条件s of 十分な 雇用 are made in the 期待 of a
産する／生じる of; say, 6 per cent, and are valued accordingly. When the
disillusion comes, this 期待 is 取って代わるd by a contrary 'error of 悲観論主義', with the result
that the 投資s, which would in fact 産する／生じる 2 per cent in
条件s of 十分な 雇用, are 推定する／予想するd to 産する／生じる いっそう少なく than
nothing; and the resulting 崩壊（する） of new 投資 then leads
to a 明言する／公表する of 失業 in which the 投資s, which would
have 産する／生じるd 2 per cent in 条件s of 十分な 雇用, in fact
産する／生じる いっそう少なく than nothing. We reach a 条件 where there is a
不足 of houses, but where にもかかわらず no one can afford to
live in the houses that there are.
Thus the 治療（薬） for the にわか景気 is not a higher 率 of 利益／興味
but a lower 率 of 利益／興味!
For that may enable the いわゆる にわか景気 to last. The 権利 治療（薬）
for the 貿易（する） cycle is not to be 設立する in 廃止するing にわか景気s and
thus keeping us 永久的に in a 半分-低迷; but in 廃止するing
低迷s and thus keeping us 永久的に in a quasi-にわか景気.
The にわか景気 which is 運命にあるd to end in a 低迷 is 原因（となる）d,
therefore, by the combination of a 率 of 利益／興味, which in a
訂正する 明言する／公表する of 期待 would be too high for 十分な
雇用, with a misguided 明言する／公表する of 期待 which, so long
as it lasts, 妨げるs this 率 of 利益／興味 from 存在 in fact
deterrent. A にわか景気 is a 状況／情勢 in which over-楽観主義 勝利s
over a 率 of 利益／興味 which, in a cooler light, would be seen
to be 過度の.
Except during the war, I 疑問 if we have any 最近の
experience of a にわか景気 so strong that it led to 十分な 雇用. In
the 部隊d 明言する／公表するs 雇用 was very 満足な in 1928-29 on normal 基準s; but I have seen no
証拠 of a 不足 of 労働, except, perhaps, in the 事例／患者 of
a few groups of 高度に specialised 労働者s. Some '瓶／封じ込める-necks'
were reached, but 生産（高） as a whole was still 有能な of その上の
拡大. Nor was there over-投資 in the sense that the 基準 and 器具／備品 of 住宅 was so high that everyone,
assuming 十分な 雇用, had all he 手配中の，お尋ね者 at a 率 which would
no more than cover the 交替／補充 cost, without any allowance
for 利益／興味, over the life of the house; and that 輸送（する）,
public services and 農業の 改良 had been carried to
a point where その上の 新規加入s could not reasonably be 推定する／予想するd
to 産する／生じる even their 交替／補充 cost. やめる the contrary. It
would be absurd to 主張する of the 部隊d 明言する／公表するs in 1929 the
存在 of over-投資 in the strict sense. The true 明言する／公表する
of 事件／事情／状勢s was of a different character. New 投資 during
the previous five years had been, indeed, on so enormous a 規模
in the aggregate that the 見込みのある 産する／生じる of その上の 新規加入s
was, coolly considered, 落ちるing 速く. 訂正する foresight would
have brought 負かす／撃墜する the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 to an
前例なく low 人物／姿／数字; so that the 'にわか景気' could not have
continued on a sound basis except with a very low long-称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 率
of 利益／興味, and an avoidance of misdirected 投資 in the
particular directions which were in danger of 存在
over-偉業／利用するd. In fact, the 率 of 利益／興味 was high enough to
阻止する new 投資 except in those particular directions which
were under the 影響（力） of 思索的な excitement and,
therefore, in special danger of 存在 over-偉業／利用するd; and a 率
of 利益／興味, high enough to 打ち勝つ the 思索的な excitement,
would have checked, at the same time, every 肉親，親類d of reasonable
new 投資. Thus an 増加する in the 率 of 利益／興味, as a
治療（薬） for the 明言する／公表する of 事件／事情／状勢s arising out of a 長引かせるd period
of abnormally 激しい new 投資, belongs to the 種類 of
治療（薬） which cures the 病気 by 殺人，大当り the 患者.
It is, indeed, very possible that the prolongation of
だいたい 十分な 雇用 over a period of years would be
associated in countries so 豊富な as 広大な／多数の／重要な Britain or the 部隊d
明言する／公表するs with a 容積／容量 of new 投資, assuming the 存在するing
propensity to 消費する, so 広大な／多数の／重要な that it would 結局 lead to a 明言する／公表する of
十分な 投資 in the sense that an aggregate 甚だしい／１２ダース 産する／生じる in
超過 of 交替／補充 cost could no longer be 推定する／予想するd on a
reasonable 計算／見積り from a その上の increment of 持続する goods
of any type whatever. Moreover, this 状況／情勢 might be reached
comparatively soonｾsay within
twenty-five years or いっそう少なく. I must not be taken to 否定する this,
because I 主張する that a 明言する／公表する of 十分な 投資 in the strict
sense has never yet occurred, not even momentarily.
その上に, even if we were to suppose that 同時代の
にわか景気s are apt to be associated with a momentary 条件 of 十分な
投資 or over-投資 in the strict sense, it would still
be absurd to regard a higher 率 of 利益／興味 as the appropriate
治療（薬）. For in this event the 事例／患者 of those who せいにする the
病気 to under-消費 would be wholly 設立するd. The
治療（薬） would 嘘（をつく） in さまざまな 対策 designed to 増加する the
propensity to 消費する by the 議席数是正 of incomes or
さもなければ; so that a given level of 雇用 would 要求する a
smaller 容積／容量 of 現在の 投資 to support it.
IV
It may be convenient at this point to say a word about the
important schools of thought which 持続する, from さまざまな points
of 見解（をとる）, that the chronic 傾向 of 同時代の societies to
under-雇用 is to be traced to under-消費;ｾthat is to say, to social practices and to
a 配当 of wealth which result in a propensity to 消費する
which is unduly low.
In 存在するing 条件sｾor, at
least, in the 条件 which 存在するd until latelyｾwhere the 容積／容量 of 投資 is
unplanned and uncontrolled, 支配する to the vagaries of the
ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都 as 決定するd by the 私的な
judgment of individuals ignorant or 思索的な, and to a long-称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 率 of 利益／興味 which
seldom or never 落ちるs below a 従来の level, these schools
of thought are, as guides to practical 政策, undoubtedly in the
権利. For in such 条件s there is no other means of raising
the 普通の／平均（する） level of 雇用 to a more 満足な level. If
it is impracticable materially to 増加する 投資, 明白に
there is no means of 安全な・保証するing a higher level of 雇用 except
by 増加するing 消費.
事実上 I only 異なる from these schools of thought in
thinking that they may lay a little too much 強調 on
増加するd 消費 at a time when there is still much social
advantage to be 得るd from 増加するd 投資.
Theoretically, however, they are open to the 批評 of
neglecting the fact that there are two ways to 拡大する 生産（高）.
Even if we were to decide that it would be better to 増加する
資本／首都 more slowly and to concentrate 成果／努力 on 増加するing
消費, we must decide this with open 注目する，もくろむs after 井戸／弁護士席
considering the 代案／選択肢. I am myself impressed by the 広大な／多数の／重要な
social advantages of 増加するing the 在庫／株 of 資本／首都 until it
中止するs to be 不十分な. But this is a practical judgment, not a
theoretical imperative.
Moreover, I should readily 譲歩する that the wisest course is
to 前進する on both 前線s at once. Whilst 目的（とする）ing at a socially
controlled 率 of 投資 with a 見解（をとる） to a 進歩／革新的な
拒絶する／低下する in the ごくわずかの efficiency of 資本／首都, I should support
at the same time all sorts of 政策s for 増加するing the
propensity to 消費する. For it is ありそうもない that 十分な 雇用
can be 持続するd, whatever we may do about 投資, with the
存在するing propensity to 消費する. There is room, therefore, for
both 政策s to operate together;ｾto
促進する 投資 and, at the same time, to 促進する 消費,
not 単に to the level which with the 存在するing propensity to
消費する would correspond to the 増加するd 投資, but to a
higher level still. Ifｾto take 一連の会議、交渉／完成する
人物／姿／数字s for the 目的 of illustrationｾthe 普通の／平均（する） level of
生産（高） of to-day is 15 per cent below what it would be with
continuous 十分な 雇用, and if 10 per cent of this 生産（高）
代表するs 逮捕する 投資 and 90 per cent of it 消費ｾif, その上に, 逮捕する 投資 would have
to rise 50 per cent ーするために 安全な・保証する 十分な 雇用 with the
存在するing propensity to 消費する, so that with 十分な 雇用
生産（高） would rise from 100 to 115, 消費 from 90 to 100 and
逮捕する 投資 from 10 to 15:ｾthen we
might 目的（とする）, perhaps, at so 修正するing the propensity to 消費する
that with 十分な 雇用 消費 would rise from 90 to 103
and 逮捕する 投資 from 10 to 12.
V
Another school of thought finds the 解答 of the 貿易（する）
cycle, not in 増加するing either 消費 or 投資, but in
減らすing the 供給（する） of 労働 捜し出すing 雇用; i.e. by
redistributing the 存在するing 容積／容量 of 雇用 without
増加するing 雇用 or 生産（高）.
This seems to me to be a premature 政策ｾmuch
more 明確に so than the 計画（する） of 増加するing 消費. A point
comes where every individual 重さを計るs the advantages of 増加するd
leisure against 増加するd income. But at 現在の the 証拠 is,
I think, strong that the 広大な／多数の／重要な 大多数 of individuals would
prefer 増加するd income to 増加するd leisure; and I see no
十分な 推論する／理由 for 説得力のある those who would prefer more
income to enjoy more leisure.
VI
It may appear 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の that a school of thought should
存在する which finds the 解答 for the 貿易（する） cycle in checking
the にわか景気 in its 早期に 行う／開催する／段階s by a higher 率 of 利益／興味. The
only line of argument, along which any justification for this
政策 can be discovered, is that put 今後 by Mr D. H. Robertson,
who assumes, in 影響, that 十分な 雇用 is an impracticable
ideal and that the best that we can hope for is a level of
雇用 much more stable than at 現在の and 普通の／平均（する）ing,
perhaps, a little higher.
If we 支配する out major changes of 政策 影響する／感情ing either the
支配（する）／統制する of 投資 or the propensity to 消費する, and assume,
概して speaking, a continuance of the 存在するing 明言する／公表する of 事件／事情／状勢s,
it is, I think, arguable that a more advantageous 普通の／平均（する） 明言する／公表する
of 期待 might result from a banking 政策 which always
nipped in the bud an incipient にわか景気 by a 率 of 利益／興味 high
enough to 阻止する even the most misguided 楽天主義者s. The
失望 of 期待, characteristic of the 低迷, may
lead to so much loss and waste that the 普通の／平均（する） level of useful
投資 might be higher if a deterrent is 適用するd. It is
difficult to be sure whether or not this is 訂正する on its own
仮定／引き受けることs; it is a 事柄 for practical judgment where 詳細（に述べる）d
証拠 is wanting. It may be that it overlooks the social
advantage which accrues from the 増加するd 消費 which
…に出席するs even on 投資 which 証明するs to have been 全く
misdirected, so that even such 投資 may be more 有益な
than no 投資 at all. にもかかわらず, the most enlightened
通貨の 支配（する）／統制する might find itself in difficulties, 直面するd with a
にわか景気 of the 1929 type in America, and 武装した with no other 武器s
than those 所有するd at that time by the 連邦の Reserve System;
and 非，不，無 of the 代案／選択肢s within its 力／強力にする might make much
difference to the result. However this may be, such an 見通し
seems to me to be 危険に and unnecessarily defeatist. It
recommends, or at least assumes, for 永久の 受託 too
much that is 欠陥のある in our 存在するing 経済的な 計画／陰謀.
The 厳格な，質素な 見解（をとる）, which would 雇う a high 率 of 利益／興味
to check at once any 傾向 in the level of 雇用 to rise
appreciably above the 普通の／平均（する） of; say, the previous １０年間, is, however, more usually
supported by arguments which have no 創立／基礎 at all apart from
混乱 of mind. It flows, in some 事例／患者s, from the belief that
in a にわか景気 投資 tends to outrun saving, and that a higher
率 of 利益／興味 will 回復する equilibrium by checking 投資
on the one 手渡す and 刺激するing 貯金 on the other. This
暗示するs that saving and 投資 can be unequal, and has,
therefore, no meaning until these 条件 have been defined in some
special sense. Or it is いつかs 示唆するd that the 増加するd
saving which …を伴ってs 増加するd 投資 is 望ましくない and
不正な because it is, as a 支配する, also associated with rising
prices. But if this were so, any 上向き change in the
存在するing level of 生産（高） and 雇用 is to be deprecated. For
the rise in prices is not essentially 予定 to the 増加する in
投資;ｾit is 予定 to the fact
that in the short period 供給（する） price usually 増加するs with
増加するing 生産（高）, on account either of the physical fact of
減らすing return or of the 傾向 of the cost-部隊 to rise in
条件 of money when 生産（高） 増加するs. If the 条件s were
those of constant 供給（する）-price, there would, of course, be no
rise of prices; yet, all the same, 増加するd saving would
…を伴って 増加するd 投資. It is the 増加するd 生産（高） which
produces the 増加するd saving; and the rise of prices is 単に a
by-製品 of the 増加するd 生産（高）, which will occur 平等に if
there is no 増加するd saving but, instead, an 増加するd
propensity to 消費する. No one has a 合法的 vested 利益／興味 in
存在 able to buy at prices which are only low because 生産（高） is
low.
Or, again, the evil is supposed to creep in if the 増加するd
投資 has been 促進するd by a 落ちる in the 率 of 利益／興味
engineered by an 増加する in the 量 of money. Yet there is
no special virtue in the pre-存在するing 率 of 利益／興味, and the
new money is not '軍隊d' on anyone;ｾit
is created ーするために 満足させる the 増加するd liquidity-preference
which corresponds to the lower 率 of 利益／興味 or the 増加するd 容積／容量
of 処理／取引s, and it is held by those individuals who prefer
to 持つ／拘留する money rather than to lend it at the lower 率 of
利益／興味. Or, once more, it is 示唆するd that a にわか景気 is
characterised by '資本／首都 消費', which 推定では means
消極的な 逮捕する 投資, i.e. by an 過度の propensity to
消費する. Unless the phenomena of the 貿易（する） cycle have been
混乱させるd with those of a flight from the 通貨 such as
occurred during the 戦後の European 通貨 崩壊（する）s, the
証拠 is wholly to the contrary. Moreover, even if it were so,
a 削減 in the 率 of 利益／興味 would be a more plausible
治療（薬） than a rise in the 率 of 利益／興味 for 条件s of
under-投資. I can make no sense at all of these schools of
thought; except, perhaps, by 供給（する）ing a tacit 仮定／引き受けること that
aggregate 生産（高） is incapable of change. But a theory which
assumes constant 生産（高） is 明白に not very serviceable for
explaining the 貿易（する） cycle.
VII
In the earlier 熟考する／考慮するs of the 貿易（する） cycle, 顕著に by J evons,
an explanation was 設立する in 農業の fluctuations 予定 to the
seasons, rather than in the phenomena of 産業. In the light
of the above theory this appears as an 極端に plausible
approach to the problem. For even to-day fluctuation in the
在庫／株s of 農業の 製品s as between one year and another
is one of the largest individual items amongst the 原因（となる）s of
changes in the 率 of 現在の 投資; whilst at the time
when Jevons wroteｾand more
特に over the period to which most of his 統計（学）
適用するdｾthis factor must have far
outweighed all others. Jevons's theory, that the 貿易（する） cycle was
まず第一に／本来 予定 to the fluctuations in the bounty of the 収穫,
can be re-明言する／公表するd as follows. When an exceptionally large 収穫
is gathered in, an important 新規加入 is usually made to the 量 carried over into later years. The
proceeds of this 新規加入 are 追加するd to the 現在の incomes of the
農業者s and are 扱う／治療するd by them as income; 反して the 増加するd
carry-over 伴う／関わるs no drain on the income-支出 of other
sections of the community but is 財政／金融d out of 貯金. That is
to say, the 新規加入 to the carry-over is an 新規加入 to 現在の
投資. This 結論 is not 無効にするd even if prices
落ちる はっきりと. 類似して when there is a poor 収穫, the
carry-over is drawn upon for 現在の 消費, so that a
corresponding part of the income-支出 of the 消費者s
creates no 現在の income for the 農業者s. That is to say, what
is taken from the carry-over 伴う／関わるs a corresponding 削減
in 現在の 投資. Thus, if 投資 in other directions is
taken to be constant, the difference in aggregate 投資
between a year in which there is a 相当な 新規加入 to the
carry-over and a year in which there is a 相当な subtraction
from it may be large; and in a community where 農業 is the
predominant 産業 it will be 圧倒的に large compared
with any other usual 原因（となる） of 投資 fluctuations. Thus it is
natural that we should find the 上向き turning-point to be 示すd
by bountiful 収穫s and the downward turning-point by deficient
収穫s. The その上の theory, that there are physical 原因（となる）s for
a 正規の／正選手 cycle of good and bad 収穫s, is, of course, a
different 事柄 with which we are not 関心d here.
More recently, the theory has been 前進するd that it is bad
収穫s, not good 収穫s, which are good for 貿易（する）, either
because bad 収穫s make the 全住民 ready to work for a
smaller real reward or because the resulting 議席数是正 of
購入（する）ing-力／強力にする is held to be favourable to 消費.
Needless to say, it is not these theories which I have in mind in
the above description of 収穫 phenomena as an explanation of
the 貿易（する） cycle.
The 農業の 原因（となる）s of fluctuation are, however, much いっそう少なく
important in the modern world for two 推論する／理由s. In the first place
農業の 生産（高） is a much smaller 割合 of total 生産（高）.
And in the second place the 開発 of a world market for
most 農業の 製品s, 製図／抽選 upon both 半球s, leads
to an 普通の／平均（する）ing out of the 影響s of good and bad seasons, the
百分率 fluctuation in the 量 of the world 収穫 存在
far いっそう少なく than the 百分率 fluctuations in the 収穫s of
individual countries. But in old days, when a country was おもに
扶養家族 on its own 収穫, it is difficult to see any possible
原因（となる） of fluctuations in 投資, except war, which was in any
way 類似の in magnitude with changes in the carry-over of
農業の 製品s.
Even to-day it is important to 支払う／賃金 の近くに attention to the part
played by changes in the 在庫／株s of raw 構成要素s, both
農業の and mineral, in the 決意 of the 率 of
現在の 投資. I should せいにする the slow 率 of 回復
from a 低迷, after the turning-point has been reached, おもに to
the deflationary 影響 of the 削減 of redundant 在庫／株s to a
normal level. At first the accumulation of 在庫／株s, which occurs
after the にわか景気 has broken, 穏健なs the 率 of the 崩壊（する）;
but we have to 支払う／賃金 for this 救済 later on in the damping-負かす／撃墜する
of the その後の 率 of 回復. いつかs, indeed, the
削減 of 在庫／株s may have to be 事実上 完全にするd before any
measurable degree of 回復 can be （悪事，秘密などを）発見するd. For a 率 of
投資 in other directions, which is 十分な to produce an
上向き movement when there is no 現在の disinvestment in 在庫／株s
to 始める，決める off against it, may be やめる 不十分な so long as such
disinvestment is still 訴訟／進行.
We have seen, I think, a signal example of this in the earlier
段階s of America's 'New 取引，協定'. When 大統領 Roosevelt's
相当な 貸付金 支出 began, 在庫／株s of all 肉親，親類dｾand 特に of 農業の 製品sｾstill stood at a
very high level. The 'New 取引，協定' partly consisted in a strenuous
試みる／企てる to 減ずる these 在庫／株sｾby
curtailment of 現在の 生産（高） and in all sorts of ways. The
削減 of 在庫／株s to a normal level was a necessary 過程ｾa 段階 which had to be 耐えるd. But so
long as it lasted, すなわち, about two years, it 構成するd a
相当な 相殺する to the 貸付金 支出 which was 存在
incurred in other directions. Only when it had been 完全にするd was
the way 用意が出来ている for 相当な 回復.
最近の American experience has also afforded good examples of
the part played by fluctuations in the 在庫／株s of finished and
unfinished goodsｾ'在庫s' as it
is becoming usual to call themｾin
原因（となる）ing the minor oscillations within the main movement of the
貿易（する） cycle. 製造業者s, setting 産業 in 動議 to 供給する
for a 規模 of 消費 which is 推定する／予想するd to 勝つ／広く一帯に広がる some
months later, are apt to make minor miscalculations, 一般に in
the direction of running a little ahead of the facts. When they
discover their mistake they have to 契約 for a short time to
a level below that of 現在の 消費 so as to 許す for the
absorption of the 超過 在庫s; and the difference of pace
between running a little ahead and dropping 支援する again has 証明するd
十分な in its 影響 on the 現在の 率 of 投資 to
陳列する，発揮する itself やめる 明確に against the background of the
excellently 完全にする 統計（学） now 利用できる in the 部隊d
明言する／公表するs.