Of knowledge

From the article ”Metaphysics”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1771

The beginning of the article Metaphysics in the Britannica of 1771. Of knowledge in general. Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, has no other 即座の 反対する but its own ideas,  which alone it does or can 熟視する／熟考する, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge  then seems to be nothing but the perception of the 関係 and 協定, or 不一致 and repugnancy of any of our ideas:  where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.  When we know that white  is not 黒人／ボイコット,  what do we but perceive that these two ideas  do not agree? Or that the three angles of a triangle,  are equal to two to 権利 ones; what do we more but perceive that equality to two 権利 ones does neccessarily agree to, and is separable from the three angles of a triangle? But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this 協定 or 不一致 consists, we may 減ずる it all to these four sorts:  1st, 身元  or 多様制;  2dly, Relation;  3dly, Coexistence;  4thly, Real 存在.  1. 身元  or 多様制.  It is the first 行為／法令／行動する of the mind, to perceive its  ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each whatit is, and その為に to perceive their difference, that is, the one not to be the other: by this the mind 明確に perceives each idea  to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all 際立った ideas  to 同意しない. This it does without any 苦痛s or deduction, by its natural 力／強力にする of perception and distinction. This is what men of art have 減ずるd to those general 支配するs, viz. what is,  is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.  But no maxim can make a man know it clearer, that 一連の会議、交渉／完成する  is not square,  than the 明らかにする perception of those two ideas,  which the mind at first sight perceives to 同意しない. 2. The next sort of 協定 or 不一致 thge mind perceives in any 肉親，親類d of its ideas,  may be called 親族,  and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas  of what 肉親，親類d soever; that is, their 協定 or 不一致 one with another in several ways the mind takes of comparing them. 3. The third sort of 協定 or 不一致 to be 設立する in our ideas, is, coexistence  or 非，不，無-coexistence  in the same 支配する; and this belongs 特に to 実体s. Thus when we pronounce 関心ing gold,  that it is 直す／買収する，八百長をするd, it 量s to no more but this, that fixedness, or a 力／強力にする to remain in the 解雇する／砲火／射撃 unconsumed, is an idea that always …を伴ってs that particular sort of yellowness, 負わせる, fusibility,  &c, which make our コンビナート／複合体 idea 示す by the word gold.  4. The fourth sort, is that of actual and real 存在  agreeing to any idea.  Within these four sorts of 協定 or 不一致, is 含む／封じ込めるd all the knowledge we have, or are 有能な of. For all that we know or can 断言する 関心ing any idea,  is, That it is, or is not the same with some other; as, that blue is not yellow:  That it does, or does not coexist with another in the same 支配する; as, that アイロンをかける is susceptible of magnetical impressions;  That it has that or this relation to some other ideas;  as, That two triangles, upon equal bases between two 平行のs, are equal:  or, that it has a real 存在 without the mind; as, that God is.  There are several ways wherein the mind is 所有するd of truth, each of which is called knowledge. First,  There is actual knowledge,  when the mind has a 現在の 見解（をとる） of the 協定 or 不一致 of any of its ideas,  or of the relation they have one with another. Secondly,  A man is said to know any proposition, when having once evidently perceived the 協定 or 不一致 of the ideas  whereof it consists, and so 宿泊するd it in his memory, that whenever it comes to be 反映するd on again, the mind assents to it without 疑問 or hesitation, and is 確かな of the truth of it. And this may be called habitual knowledge.  And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are 宿泊するd in his memory by a foregoing, （疑いを）晴らす, and 十分な perception. Of habitual knowledge  there are two sorts: The one is of such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it 現実に perceives the relatin that is between those ideas.  And this is in all those truths, where the ideas  themselves, by an 即座の 見解（をとる）, discover their 協定 or 不一致 one with another. The other is of such truths, whereof the mind having been 納得させるd, it 保持するs the memory of the 有罪の判決, without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of as triangle are equal to two 権利 ones, knows it to be true, when the demonstration is gone out of his mind, and かもしれない cannot be recollected: But he knows it in a different way from what he did before, すなわち, not by the 介入 of thos eintermediate ideas,  whereby the 協定 or 不一致 of thois ein the proposition was at first perceived, but by remembring, i.e.  knowing that he was once 確かな of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 権利 ones. The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things, is now the idea  that shews him, that if the three angles of a trianglöe were once equal to two 権利 ones, they will always be so. And hence he comes to be 確かな , that what was once true, is always true; what ideas  once agreed, will always agree; and その結果, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Of the degrees of our knowledge. All our knowledge consisting in the 見解（をとる） the mind has of its own ideas,  which is the 最大の light and greatest certainty we are 有能な of, the different clearness of our knowledge  seems to 嘘（をつく） in the different way of perception the mind has of the 協定 or 不一致 of any of its ideas.  When the mind perceives this 協定 or 不一致 of two ideas すぐに  by themselves, without the 介入 of any other, we may call it intuitive knowledge,  in which 事例／患者s the mind perceives truth, as the 注目する，もくろむ does light, only by 存在 directed に向かって it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not 黒人／ボイコット;  that three are more than two,  and equal to one and two.  This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like the 有望な sun-向こうずね, 軍隊s itself すぐに to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its 見解（をとる） that way. It is on this intuition  that depends all the certainty and 証拠 of our other knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be so 広大な／多数の／重要な, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not 要求する a greater. The next degree of knowledge, is, where the mind perceives not this 協定 or 不一致 すぐに, or by the juxta-position,  as it were, of the ideas,  because those ideas  関心ing whose 協定 or 不一致 the 調査 is made, cannot by the mind be so put together, as to shew it. In this 事例／患者 the mind is fond to discover the 協定 or 不一致 which it searches, by the 介入 of other ideas:  And this is that which we call 推論する／理由ing.  And thus, if we would know the 協定 or 不一致 in bigness, between the three angles of a triangle, and two 権利 angles, we cannot by an 即座の 見解（をとる） and comparing them do it; because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one or two angles. And so of this the mind has no 即座の or intuitive knowledge. But we must find out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have equality; and finding those equal to two 権利 ones, we come to know the equality of these three angles to two 権利 ones. Those 介入するing ideas  which serve to shew the 協定 of any two others, are called proofs;  and where the 協定 or 不一致 is by this means plainly and 明確に perceived, it is called demonstration. A quickness in the mind to find those proofs, and to 適用する them 権利, is that which is called sagacity.  This knowledge, though it be 確かな , is not so （疑いを）晴らす and evident as intuitive  knowledge. It 要求するs 苦痛s and attention, and 安定した 使用／適用 of mind, to discover the 協定 or 不一致 of the ideas  it considers; and there must be a progression by steps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty. Before demonstration there was a 疑問, which, in intuitive knowledge,  cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of preception left to a degree 有能な of 際立った ideas,  no more than it can be a 疑問 to the 注目する，もくろむ (that can distinctly see white  and 黒人／ボイコット)  whether this 署名／調印する and paper be all of a colour. Now, in every step that 推論する／理由 makes in demonstrative knowledge,  there is an intuitive knowledge  of that 協定 or 不一致 it 捜し出すs with the next 中間の idea,  which it uses as a proof; for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such 協定 or 不一致, there is no knowledge produced. By which it is evident, that every step in 推論する／理由ing, that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty:  which when the mind perceives, there is no more 要求するd but to remember it, to make the 協定 or 不一致 of the ideas  関心ing which we 問い合わせ 明白な and 確かな . This intuitive perception  of the 協定 or 不一致 of the 中間の ideas  in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be 正確に／まさに carried in the mind; and a man must be sure that no part is left out; which because in long deductions the memory cannot easily 保持する, this knowledge becomes more imperfect than intuitive,  and men often embrace falsehoods for demonstrations.

It has been 一般に taken for 認めるd, that mathematicks  alone are 有能な of demonstrative certainty. But to have such an 協定 or 不一致 as may be intuitively perceived, 存在 not the 特権 of the ideas  of number, 拡張,  and 人物／姿／数字  alone, it may かもしれない be the want of 予定 method and 使用／適用 in us, and not of 十分な 証拠 in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge: For in whatever ideas  the mind can perceive the 協定 or 不一致 すぐに, there it is 有能な of intuitive knowledge:  And where it can perceive the 協定 or 不一致 of any two ideas,  by an intuitive perception  of the 協定 or 不一致 they have with any 中間の ideas,  there the mind is 有能な of demonstration which is not 限られた／立憲的な to the ideas  of 人物／姿／数字, number, 拡張, or their 方式s. The 推論する／理由 why it has been 一般に supposed to belong to them only, is, because in comparing their equality or 超過 the 方式s of numbers  have every the least difference very （疑いを）晴らす and perceivable: And in 拡張,  though every the least 超過 is not so perceptible, yet the mind has 設立する out ways to discover the just equality of two angles, 拡張s, or 人物／姿／数字s; and both, that is, numbers and 人物／姿／数字s, can be 始める，決める 負かす／撃墜する by 明白な and 継続している 示すs.

But in other simple ideas,  whose 方式s and differences are made and counted by degrees, and not 量, we have not so nice and 正確な a distinction of their differences, as to perceive or find ways to 手段 their just equality, or the least differences: For those other simple ideas  存在 外見s or sensations produced in us by the size, 人物／姿／数字, 動議,  &c. of minute 血球s singly insensible, their different degrees also depend on the variation of some, or all of those 原因（となる）s; which since it cannot be 観察するd by us in 粒子s of 事柄, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact 対策 of the different degrees of these simple ideas.  Thus, for instance, not knowing what number of 粒子s, nor what 動議 of them, is sit to produce any 正確な degree of whiteness,  we cannot 論証する the 確かな equality of any two degrees of whiteness,  because we have no 確かな 基準 to 手段 them by, nor means to distinguish every the least difference; the only help we have 存在 from our senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is so 広大な／多数の／重要な as to produce in the mind ideas  明確に 際立った, there ideas  of colours,  as we see in different 肉親，親類d, blue  and red,  (for instance,) are as 有能な of demonstration as ideas  of number and 拡張. What is here said of colours, 持つ／拘留するs true in all 第２位 qalities. These two then, intuition  and demonstration,  are the degress of our knowledge;  whatever comes short of one of these, is but 約束  or opinion,  not knowledge,  at least, in all general truths.  There is, indeed, another perception of the mind 雇うd about the particular 存在 of finite 存在s  without us; which going beyond probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the 指名する of knowledge.

Nothing can be more 確かな , than that the idea  we receive from an 外部の 反対する is in our minds: This is intuitive knowledge;  but whether we can thence certainly infer the 存在 of any thing without us, corresponding to that idea,  is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such an idea  in their minds, when no such things 存在する, no such 反対する 影響する／感情s their senses. But its evident that we are invincibly conscious to ourselves of a different perception, when we look upon the sun  in the day, and think on it by night; when we 現実に taste wormwood,  or smell a rose, or only think on that savour  or odour.  So that we may 追加する to the two former sorts of knowledge, this also of the 存在 of particular 外部の 反対するs, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual 入り口 of ideas  from them, and 許す these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative,  and 極度の慎重さを要する.

But since our knowledge is 設立するd on, and 雇うd about our ideas  only, will it follow thence that it must be conformable to our ideas;  and that where our ideas  are （疑いを）晴らす and 際立った, obscure and 混乱させるd, there our knowledge will be so too? No. For our knowledge consisting in the perception of the 協定 or 不一致 of any two ideas,  its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas  themselves. A man (for instance) that has a （疑いを）晴らす idea  of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two 権利 ones, may yet have but an obscure perception of their 協定; and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. But obscure and 混乱させるd ideas  can never produce any （疑いを）晴らす or 際立った knowledge; because, as far as any ideas  are obscure or 混乱させるd, so far the mind can never perceive 明確に whether they agree or 同意しない. Of the extent of human knowledge. From what has been said 関心ing knowledge, it follows, First,  That we can have no knowledge さらに先に than we have ideas. Secondly,  That we have no knowledge さらに先に than we can have perception of that 協定 or 不一致 of our ideas,  either by intuition, demonstration,  or sensation.  Thirdly,  We cannot have an intuitive  knowledge that shall 延長する itself to all our ideas,  and all that we would know about them, because we cannot 診察する and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxta-position, or an 即座の comparison one with another. Thus we cannot intuitively  perceive the equality of two 拡張s, the difference of whose 人物／姿／数字s makes their parts incapable of an exact 即座の 使用／適用. Fourthly,  Our 合理的な／理性的な  knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas;  because between two different ideas  we would 診察する, we cannot always find such proofs  as we can connect one to another, with an intuitive knowledge  in all the parts of the deduction. Fifthly, 極度の慎重さを要する  knowledge reaching no さらに先に than the 存在 of things 現実に 現在の to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former. Sixthly,  From all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge,  comes not only short of the reality of things,  but even of the extent of our own ideas.  We have the ideas  of a square,  a circle,  and equality;  and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square.  The affirmations or negations we make 関心ing the ideas  we have, 存在 減ずるd to the four sorts above について言及するd, viz. 身元, coexistence, relation,  and real 存在,  we shall 診察する how far our knowledge 延長するs in each of these. First,  As to 身元 and 多様制,  our intuitive knowledge  is as far 延長するd as our ideas  themselves; and there can be no idea  in the mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive knowledge,  perceived to be what it is, and to be different from any other. Secondly,  As to the 協定 or 不一致 of our ideas  in coexistence:  In this our knowledge is very short; though in this consists the greatest and most 構成要素 part of our knowledge, 関心ing 実体s.  For our ideas  of 実体s  存在 nothing but 確かな collections of simple  ideas, coexisting in one 支配する,  (our idea  of 炎上,  for instance, is a 団体／死体 hot, luminous,  and moving 上向き;)  when we would know any thing さらに先に 関心ing this, or any other sort of 実体, what do we but 問い合わせ what other 質s or 力／強力にするs these 実体s have, or have not? Which is nothing else but to know what other simple ideas  do or do not coexist  with those that （不足などを）補う that コンビナート／複合体 idea.  The 推論する／理由 of this is, because the simple ideas  which （不足などを）補う our コンビナート／複合体 ideas  of 実体s, have no 明白な-necessary 関係 or inconsistense with other simple ideas  whose coexistence with them we would 知らせる ourselves about. These ideas  存在 likewise, for the most part, 第２位 質s,  which depend upon the 最初の／主要な  質s of their minute or insensible parts, or on something yet more remote from our comprehension, it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another, since we know not the root from whence they spring, or the size, 人物／姿／数字, and texture of parts on which they depend, and from which they result. Besides this, there is no discoverable 関係  between any 第２位  質, and those 最初の／主要な  質s that it depends on. We are so far from knowing what 人物／姿／数字, size, or 動議 produces (for instance) a yellow colour,  or 甘い taste,  or a sharp sound,  that we can by no means conceive how any size, 人物／姿／数字,  or 動議  can かもしれない produce in us the idea  of any colour, taste,  or sound  どれでも; and there is no 考えられる 関係 between the one and the other. Our knowledge therefore of coexistence reaches little さらに先に than experience,  Some few, indeed, of the 最初の／主要な  qalities have a necessary dependence and 明白な 関係 one with another; as 人物／姿／数字  やむを得ず supposes 拡張, receiving or communicating 動議 by impulse  supposes solidity.  But 質s coexistent in any 支配する, without this dependence and 関係, cannot certainly be known to coexist any さらに先に than experience by our senses 知らせるs us. Thus, though upon 裁判，公判 we find gold  yellow, 重大な, malleable, fusible, and 直す／買収する，八百長をするd, yet because 非，不，無 of these have any evident dependence or necessary 関係 with the other, we cannot certainly know that where any four  of these are, the fifth  will be there also, how 高度に probable soever it may be: But the highest degree of probality  量s not to certainty;  without which there can be no true knowledge: For this coexistence can be no その上の known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either, in particular  支配するs, by the 観察 of our senses, or, in general,  by the necessary 関係 of the ideas  themselves. As to incompatibility,  or repugnancy to coexistence,  we may know that any 支配する can have of each sort of 最初の／主要な  質s but one particular at once, one 拡張, one 人物／姿／数字; and so of sensible ideas,  peculiar to each sense: for whatever of each 肉親，親類d is 現在の in any 支配する, 除外するs all other of that fort; for instance, one 支配する cannot have two smells  or two colours  at the same time. As to 力／強力にするs of 実体s,  which make a 広大な／多数の／重要な part of our 調査s about them, and are no inconsiderable 支店 of our knowledge; our knowledge as to these reaches little さらに先に than experience;  because they consist in a texture and 動議 of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover. Experience  is that which in this part we must depend on; and it were to be wished that it were more 改善するd. As to the third sort, the 協定 or 不一致 of our ideas in any other relation,  this is the largest field of knowledge, and it is hard to determinate how far it may 延長する. This part depending on our sagacity in finding 中間の ideas  that may shew the habitudes and relations of ideas,  it is an hard 事柄 to tell when we are at the end of such 発見s. They that are ignorant of algebra,  cannot imagine the wonders in this 肉親，親類d that are to be done by it; and what さらに先に 改良s and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not 平易な to 決定する. The ideas  of 量  are not those alone that are 有能な of demonstration and knowledge; other, and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation, would undoubtedly afford us certainty, if 副／悪徳行為s, passions, and domineering 利益／興味, did not …に反対する or menace endeavours of this 肉親，親類d. The idea  of a 最高の 存在,  infinite in 力／強力にする, goodness, and 知恵, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea  of ourselves,  as understanding 合理的な／理性的な creatures; would, if duely considered, afford such 創立／基礎s of our 義務,  and 支配するs of 活動／戦闘,  as might place morality  の中で the sciences 有能な of demonstration. The relations of other 方式s may certainly be perseived, 同様に as those of number and 拡張. Where there is no 所有物／資産／財産, there is no 不正,  is a proposition as 確かな as any demonstration in Euclid:  for the idea  of 所有物／資産／財産  存在 a 権利 to any thing; and the idea  of 不正,  存在 the 侵略 or 違反 of that 権利; it is evident, that these ideas  存在 thus 設立するd, and these 指名するs 別館d to them, we can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two 権利 ones.  Again, No 政府 許すs 絶対の liberty.  The idea  of 政府  存在 the 設立 of society upon 確かな 支配するs or 法律s which 要求する 順応／服従 to them, and the idea  of 絶対の liberty  存在 for any one to do whatever he pleases, we are as 有能な of 存在 確かな of the truth of this proposition, as of any in mathematicks.  What has given the advantage to the ideas  of 質,  and made them thought more 有能な of certainty and demonstration, is, First,  That they can be 代表するd by sensible 示すs which have a nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds. Diagrams  drawn on paper are copies of the ideas,  and not liable to the 不確定 that words carry in their signification: But we have no sensible 示すs that 似ている our moral ideas,  and nothing but words to 表明する them by; which though when written they remain the same, yet the ideas  they stand for may change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons. Secondly, Moral ideas  are 一般的に more コンビナート／複合体 than 人物／姿／数字s. Whence these two inconveniences follow: First,  That their 指名するs are of more uncertain signification; the 正確な collection of simple ideas  they stand for not 存在 so easily agreed on, and so the 調印する that is used for them in communication always, and in thinking often, does not 刻々と carry with it the same idea. Secondly,  The mind cannot easily 保持する those 正確な combinations so 正確に／まさに and perfectly as is necessary; in the examination of the habitudes and correspondencies, 協定s or 不一致s of several of them one with another, 特に where it is to be 裁判官d off by long deductions, and the 介入 of several other コンビナート／複合体 ideas,  to shew the 協定 or 不一致 of two remote ones. Now one part of these disadvantages in moral ideas,  which has made them be thought not 有能な ofdemonstration, may in good 手段 be 治療（薬）d by 鮮明度／定義s,  setting 負かす／撃墜する that collection of simple ideas  which every 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 shall stand for, and then using the 条件 刻々と and 絶えず for that 正確な collection. As to the fourth sort of knowledge, viz.  of the real actual 存在 of things,  we have an intuitive  knowledge of our own 存在;  a demonstrative  knowledge of the 存在 of God;  and a 極度の慎重さを要する  knowledge of the 反対するs that 現在の themselves to our senses.

From what has been said, we may discover the 原因（となる）s of our ignorance;  which are 主として these three: First,  Want of ideas: Secondly,  Want of a discoverable 関係 between the ideas  we have: Thirdly,  Want of tracing and 診察するing our ideas.

First,  There are some things we are ignorant of for want of ideas.  All the simple ideas  we have are 限定するd to the 観察s of our senses, and the 操作／手術s of our own minds that we are conscious of in ourselves. What other ideas  it is possible other creatures may have, by the 援助 of other senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to 決定する; but to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man should be 肯定的な in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no manner of idea  of any such thing. What faculties therefore other 種類 of creatures have to 侵入する into the nature and inmost 憲法s of things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other 見解（をとる）s of them, besides those we have, to make 発見s of them more perfect. The 知識人  and sensible  world are in this perfectly alike, that the parts which we see of either of them, 持つ／拘留する no 割合 with that we see not; and どれでも we can reach with our 注目する，もくろむs or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the 残り／休憩（する）. Another 広大な／多数の／重要な 原因（となる） of ignorance, is the want of ideas that we are 有能な of.  This keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive 有能な of 存在 known. 本体，大部分／ばら積みの, 人物／姿／数字, and 動議 we have ideas  of; yet not knowing what is the particular 本体，大部分／ばら積みの, 動議, and 人物／姿／数字 of the greatest part of the 団体／死体s of the universe, we are ignorant of the several 力／強力にするs, efficacies, and ways of 操作／手術, whereby the 影響s we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things, by 存在 too remote;  in others, by 存在 too minute.  When we consider the 広大な distance of the known and 明白な parts of the world, and the 推論する／理由s we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the 巨大な universe, we shall then discover an 抱擁する abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabricks of the 広大な／多数の／重要な 集まりs of 事柄, which （不足などを）補う the whole stupenduous でっちあげる，人を罪に陥れる of corporeal 存在s; how far they are 延長するd; and what is their 動議, and how continued; and what 影響（力） they have upon one another; are contemplations, that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we 限定する our thoughts to this little system of our sun, and the grosser 集まりs of 事柄 that visibly move about it; what several sorts of vegetables, animals, and 知識人 corporeal 存在s, infinitely different from those of our little 位置／汚点／見つけ出す of earth, may probably be in other 惑星s,  to the knowledge of which, even of their outward 人物／姿／数字s and parts, we can no way 達成する, whilst we are 限定するd to this earth, there 存在 no natural means, either by sensation or reflection, to 伝える their 確かな ideas  into our minds? There are other 団体／死体s in the universe, no いっそう少なく 隠すd from us by their minuteness.  These insensible 血球s 存在 the active parts of 事柄, and the 広大な／多数の／重要な 器具s of nature on which depend all their 第２位  質s and 操作／手術s, our want of 正確な 際立った ideas  of their 最初の／主要な  質s keeps us in incurable ignorance of what we 願望（する） to know about them. Did we know the mechanical affections of rhubarb  and あへん,  we might as easily account for their 操作／手術s of 粛清するing  or 原因（となる）ing sleep,  as a watchmaker can for the 動議s of his watch. The 解散させるing of silver in aqua fortis,  or gold  in aqua regia,  and not 副／悪徳行為 versa,  would be then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a smith  to understand why the turning of one 重要な will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses 激烈な／緊急の enough to discover the minute 粒子s of 団体／死体s, and to give us ideas  of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their 所有物／資産／財産s and 操作／手術s: Nor can we be 保証するd about them any さらに先に than some few 裁判，公判s we make are able to reach; but whether they will 後継する again another time, we cannot be 確かな . This 妨げるs our 確かな knowledge of 全世界の／万国共通の truths 関心ing natural 団体／死体s; and our 推論する／理由 carries us herein very little beyond particular 事柄s of fact. And therefore, how far soever human 産業 may 前進する useful and 実験の philosophy  in physical things, yet scientifical  will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and 適する ideas  of those very 団体／死体s which are nearest to us, and most under our 命令（する）. This, at first sight, shews us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent, even of 構成要素  存在s; to which if we 追加する the consideration of that infinite number of spirits  that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance; we shall find this 原因（となる） of ignorance 隠す from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole 知識人  world, a greater certainly, and a more beautiful world than the 構成要素:  For bating some very few ideas  of spirit we get from our own mind by reflection, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits,  the Author of them and us and all things, we have no 確かな （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状） so much as of the 存在 of other spirits but by 発覚; much いっそう少なく have we 際立った ideas  of their different natures, 明言する／公表するs, 力／強力にするs, and several 憲法s, wherein they agree or 異なる one from another, and from us: And therefore in what 関心s their different 種類 and 所有物／資産／財産s, we are under an 絶対の ignorance. The second  原因（となる） of ignorance, is the want of discoverable 関係  between those ideas  we have: Where we want that, we are utterly incapable of 全世界の／万国共通の  and 確かな   knowledge: and are, as in the former 事例／患者, left only to 観察  and 実験.  Thus the mechanical affections of 団体／死体s having no affinity at all with the ideas  they produce in us, we can have no 際立った knowledge of such 操作／手術s beyond our experience; and can 推論する／理由 no さもなければ about them, than as the 影響s or 任命 of an infinitely wise スパイ／執行官,  which perfectly より勝る our comprehensions.

The 操作／手術 of our minds upon our 団体／死体s, is as 信じられない. How any thought  should produce a 動議 in 団体／死体,  is as remote from the nature of our ideas,  as how any 団体／死体  should produce any thought in the mind.  That it is so, if experience did not 納得させる us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us.

In some of our ideas  there are 確かな relations, habitudes, and 関係s, so visibly 含むd in the nature of the ideas  themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any 力／強力にする どれでも: In these only we are 有能な of 確かな and 全世界の／万国共通の knowledge. Thus the idea  of a 権利 lined triangle,  neccessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two 権利 ones.  But the coherence and 連続 of the parts of 事柄, the 生産／産物 of sensation in us of colours  and sounds,  &c. by impulse and 動議, 存在 such wherein we can discover no natural 関係 with any ideas  we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the 独断的な will and good 楽しみ of the wise Architect. The things that we 観察する 絶えず to proceed 定期的に, we may 結論する to 行為／法令／行動する by a 法律 始める，決める them; but yet by a 法律 that we know not; whereby, though 原因（となる）s work 刻々と, and 影響s 絶えず flow from them, yet their 関係s and dependencies 存在 not discoverable in our ideas,  we can have but an 実験の knowledge of them. The third 原因（となる） of ignorance, is our want of tracing those ideas we have  or may have, and finding out those 中間の ideas  which may shew us what habitude of 協定 or 不一致 they may have one with another: And thus many are ignorant of mathematical  truths, for want of 使用／適用 in 問い合わせing, 診察するing, and by 予定 ways comparing those ideas.  Hitherto we have 診察するd the extent  of our knowledge, in 尊敬（する）・点 of the several sorts of 存在s that are: There is another extent  of it, in 尊敬（する）・点 of universality,  which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas.  If the ideas  are abstract,  whose 協定 or 不一致 we perceive, our knowledge is 全世界の／万国共通の.  For what is known of such general ideas,  will be true of every particular thing in which that essence,  that is abstract idea,  is to be 設立する: And what is once known of such ideas,  will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that, as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own minds: And it is only the 診察するing of our own ideas  that furnishes us with that. Truths belonging to essences of things, (that is, to abstract ideas),  are eternal,  and are to be 設立する out by the contemplation only of those essences, as the 存在 of things is to be known only from experience. Of the reality of our knowledge. The reader by this time may be ready to 反対する, If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the 協定 or 不一致 of our own ideas,  the 見通しs of an 熱中している人,  and the reasonings of a sober  man, will be 平等に 確かな : It is no 事柄 how things are, so a man 観察する but the 協定 of his own imaginations, and talk conformably: it is all truth, all certainty. To this it is answered, that if our knowledge of our ideas  should 終結させる in them, and reach no さらに先に, where there is something さらに先に ーするつもりであるd, our most serious thoughts would be of little more use than the reveries  of a crazy brain. But it is evident, that this way of certainty,  by the knowledge of our own ideas,  goes a little さらに先に than 明らかにする imagination: and that all the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing else but this knowledge of our ideas.  It is evident, that the mind knows not things すぐに, but by the 介入 of the ideas  it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real,  only so far as there is a 順応／服従 between our ideas  and the reality of things. But how shall we know when our ideas  agree with things themselves? There are two sorts  of ideas,  that we may be 保証するd agree with things: These are, First, Simple  ideas; which since the mind can by no means make to itself, must be the 影響 of things operating upon the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions, which, by the will of our 製造者, they are 任命するd and adapted to. Hence it fullows, that simple ideas  are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and 正規の／正選手 生産／産物s of things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the 順応／服従 our 明言する／公表する 要求するs, which is to 代表する things under those 外見s they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the idea  of whiteness,  as it is in the mind, 正確に／まさに answers that 力／強力にする which is in any 団体／死体 to produce it there. And this 順応／服従 between our simple ideas,  and the 存在 of things, is 十分な for real knowledge. Secondly,  All our コンビナート／複合体 ideas,  except those of 実体s, 存在 archetypes  of the mind´s own making, and not referred to the 存在 of things as to their 初めのs, cannot want any 順応／服従 neccessary to real knowledge: For that which is not designed to reprecent any thing but itself, can never be 有能な of a wrong 代表. Here the ideas  themselves are considered as archetypes, and things no さもなければ regarded than as they are conformable to them. Thus the mathematician  considers the truth and 所有物／資産／財産s belonging to a rectangle,  or circle,  only as they are ideas  in his own mind, which かもしれない he never 設立する 存在するing mathematically, that is, 正確に true; yet his knowledge is not only 確かな , but real;  because real things are no さらに先に 関心d, nor ーするつもりであるd to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes  in his mind. It is true of the idea  of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two 権利 ones:  It is true also of a triangle,  wherever it 存在するs:  What is true of those 人物／姿／数字s  that have barely an ideal  存在 in his mind, will 持つ／拘留する true of them also when they come to have a real  存在 in 事柄.

Hense it follows, that moral  knowledge is as 有能な of real certainty  as mathematicks:  For certainty  存在 nothing but the perception of the 協定 or 不一致 of our ideas,  and demonstration nothing but the perception of such 協定 by the 介入 of other ideas,  our moral ideas,  同様に as mathematical,  存在 archetypes  themselves, and so 適する or 完全にする ideas,  all the 協定 or 不一致 we shall find in them will produce real  knowledge, 同様に as in mathematical 人物／姿／数字s.  That which is requisite to make our knowledge 確かな ,  is the clearness of our ideas:  and that which is 要求するd to make it real,  is, that they answer their archetypes.

Thirdly,  But the コンビナート／複合体 ideas,  which we 言及する to archetypes  without us, may 異なる from them, and so our knowledge about them may come short of 存在 real; and such are our ideas  of 実体s.  These must be taken from something that does or has 存在するd, and not be made up of ideas  arbitrarily put together, without any real pattern. Herein, therefore, is 設立するd the reality of our knowledge 関心ing 実体s,  that all our コンビナート／複合体 ideas  of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to coexist in nature. And our ideas  存在 thus true, tho' not perhaps very exact copies, are the 支配するs of the real  knowledge of them. Whatever ideas  we have, the 協定 we find they have with others will be knowledge. If those ideas  be abstract, it will be general  knowledge. But to make it real  関心ing 実体s,  the ideas  must be taken from the real 存在 of things. Wherever, therefore, we perceive the 協定 or 不一致 of our ideas,  there is 確かな knowledge:  And wherever we are sure those ideas  agree with the reality of things, there is 確かな real knowledge.  Of truth in general. Truth, in the proper 輸入する of the world, signifies the joining or separating of 調印するs, as the things 示す by them do agree or 同意しない one with another, The joining or separating of 調印するs, is what we call propositions:  so that truth  適切に belongs only to propositions:  Whereof there are two sorts, mental  and 言葉の;  as there are two  sorts of 調印するs 一般的に made use of, ideas  and words.

It is difficult to 扱う／治療する of mental  propositions without 言葉の;  because, in speaking of mental,  we must make use of words,  and then they become 言葉の.  Again, men 一般的に in their thoughts and reasonings use words  instead of ideas:  特に if the 支配する of their meditation 含む／封じ込めるs in it コンビナート／複合体 ideas.  If we have occasion to form mental  propositions about white, 黒人／ボイコット, circle,  &c. we can, and often do, でっちあげる，人を罪に陥れる in our minds the ideas  themselves, without 反映するing on the 指名するs:  But when we would consider, or make propositions about the more コンビナート／複合体 ideas,  as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory,  &c. we usually put the 指名する  for the idea;  because the idea  these 指名するs  stand for 存在 for the most part 混乱させるd, imperfect, and undetermined, we 反映する on the 指名するs  themselves, as 存在 more （疑いを）晴らす, 確かな , and 際立った, and readier to occur to our thoughts, than pure ideas;  and so we make use of these words  instead of the ideas  themselves, even when we would meditate and 推論する／理由 within ourselves, and make tacit mental propositions.

We must then 観察する two sorts of propositions  that we are 有能な of making: First. Mental propositions,  wherein the ideas  in our understandings are put together or separated by the mind perceiving or 裁判官ing of their 協定 or 不一致. Secondly, 言葉の propositions;  which are words put together or separated in affirmative or 消極的な 宣告，判決s: So that proposition  consists in joining or separating 調印するs; and truth  consists in putting together or separating these 調印するs, （許可，名誉などを）与えるing as the things they stand for agree or 同意しない. Truth,  同様に as knowledge, may 井戸／弁護士席 come under the distinction of 言葉の  and real;  that 存在 only 言葉の truth,  wherein 条件 are joined によれば the 協定 or 不一致 of the ideas  they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas  are such as really have or are 有能な of having an 存在 in nature. But then it is they 含む／封じ込める real truth,  when these 調印するs are joined as our ideas  agree: and when our ideas are such as, we know, are 有能な of having an 存在 in nature; which in 実体s we cannot know, but by knowing that such have 存在するd. Truth  is the 場内取引員／株価 負かす／撃墜する in words the 協定 or 不一致 of ideas  as it is: Falsehood  is the 場内取引員／株価 負かす／撃墜する in words the 協定 or 不一致 of ideas  さもなければ than it is; and so for as these ideas,  thus 示すd by sounds, agree to their archetypes,  so far only is the truth real.  The knowledge of this truth  consists in knowing what ideas  the words stand for, and the perception of the 協定 or 不一致 of those ideas,  （許可，名誉などを）与えるing as it is 示すd by those words. Besides truth  taken in the strict sense before について言及するd, there are other sorts of truths:  As, first, Moral truth;  which is speaking things によれば the 説得／派閥 of our own minds. Secondly, Metaphysical truth;  which is nothing but the real 存在 of things conformable to the ideas  to which we have 別館d their 指名するs. These considerations of truth  either having been before taken notice of, or not 存在 much to our 現在の 目的, it may 十分である here only to have について言及するd them.