"Be 関心d with the 井戸／弁護士席-存在 of the 集まりs, 支払う／賃金 Attention to Methods of Work" (January 27, 1934), Selected 作品,  Vol. I. p. 147.*

What is a true bastion of アイロンをかける? It is the 集まりs, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and 心から support the 革命. That is the real アイロンをかける bastion which it is impossible, and 絶対 impossible, for any 軍隊 on earth to 粉砕する. The 反対する-革命 cannot 粉砕する us; on the contrary, we shall 粉砕する it. 決起大会／結集させるing millions upon millions of people 一連の会議、交渉／完成する the 革命の 政府 and 拡大するing our 革命の war, we shall wipe out all 反対する-革命 and take over the whole of 中国.

Ibid.,  p. 150.*

The richest source of 力／強力にする to 行う war lies in the 集まりs of the people. It is おもに because of the unorganized 明言する／公表する of the Chinese 集まりs that Japan dares to いじめ（る） us. When this defect is 治療（薬）d, then the Japanese 攻撃者, like a mad bull 衝突，墜落ing into a （犯罪の）一味 of 炎上s, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their 発言する／表明するs will strike terror into him, and he will be 燃やすd to death.

"On 長引いた War" (May 1938), Selected 作品,  Vol. II, p. 186.

The 帝国主義のs are いじめ（る）ing us in such a way that we will have to を取り引きする them 本気で. Not only must we have a powerful 正規の／正選手 army, we must also 組織する 次第で変わる／派遣部隊s of the people's 民兵 on a big 規模. This will make it difficult for the 帝国主義のs to move a 選び出す／独身 インチ in our country in the event of 侵略.

Interview with a Hsinhua News 機関 特派員 (September 29, 1958).

Considering the 革命の war as a whole, the 操作／手術s of the people's ゲリラ兵s and those of the main 軍隊s of the Red Army complement each other like a man's 権利 arm and left arm, and if we had only the main 軍隊s of the Red Army without the people's ゲリラ兵s, we would be like a 軍人 with only one arm. In 固める／コンクリート 条件, and 特に with regard to 軍の 操作／手術s, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an 武装した people. That is the main 推論する／理由 why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.

"Problems of 戦略 in 中国's 革命の War" (December 1936), Selected 作品,  Vol. I, p. 238.

Unquestionably, victory or 敗北・負かす in war is 決定するd おもに by the 軍の, political, 経済的な and natural 条件s on both 味方するs. But not by these alone. It is also 決定するd by each 味方する's subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavour to 勝利，勝つ a war, a 軍の strategist cannot overstep the 制限s 課すd by the 構成要素 条件s; within these 制限s, however, he can and must 努力する／競う for victory. The 行う／開催する／段階 of 活動／戦闘 for a 軍の strategist is built upon 客観的な 構成要素 条件s, but on that 行う／開催する／段階 he can direct the 業績／成果 of many a 演劇, 十分な of sound and colour, 力／強力にする and grandeur.

Ibid.,  pp. 190-91.*

The 反対する of war is 特に "to 保存する oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to 武装解除する him or "奪う him of the 力／強力にする to resist", and does not mean to destroy every member of his 軍隊s 肉体的に). In 古代の 戦争, the spear and the 保護物，者 were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the 保護物，者 to defend and 保存する oneself. To the 現在の day, all 武器s are still an 拡張 of the spear and the 保護物，者. The 爆撃機, the machine-gun, the longrange gun and 毒（薬） gas are 開発s of the spear, while the 空気／公表する-（警察の）手入れ，急襲 避難所, the steel helmet, the 固める／コンクリート 要塞 and the gas mask are developrnents of the 保護物，者. The 戦車／タンク is a new 武器 連合させるing the 機能（する）／行事s of both spear and 保護物，者. Attack is the 長，指導者 means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the 即座の 反対する is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-保護, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence the 即座の 反対する is to 保存する yourself, but at the same time defence is a means of 補足（する）ing attack or 準備するing to go over to the attack. 退却／保養地 is in the 部類 of defence and is a 延長／続編 of defence, while 追跡 is a 延長／続編 of attack. It should be pointed out that 破壊 of the enemy is the 最初の／主要な 反対する of war and self-保護 the 第２位, because onlv by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one 効果的に 保存する oneself. Therefore attack, the 長，指導者 means of destroying the enemy, is 最初の／主要な, while defence, a 補足の means of destroying the enemy and a means of self-保護, is 第２位. In actual 戦争 the 長，指導者 役割 is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the 残り／休憩（する） of the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains 最初の／主要な.

"On 長引いた War" (May 1938). Selected 作品,  Vol. II, p. 156.

All the guiding 原則s of 軍の 操作／手術s grow out of the one basic 原則: to 努力する／競う to the 最大の to 保存する one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy.... How then do we 正当化する the 激励 of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, いつかs an 極端に high one. Is this not in contradiction with "保存するing oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it more 正確に／まさに, sacrifice and self-保護 are both opposite and complementary to each other. For such sacrifice is 必須の not only for destroying the enemy but also for 保存するing oneself - 部分的な／不平等な and 一時的な "非，不，無-保護" (sacrihce, or 支払う／賃金ing the price) is necessary for the sake of general and 永久の 保護. From this basic 原則 茎・取り除くs the 一連の 原則s guiding 軍の 操作／手術s, all of which - from the 原則s of 狙撃 (taking cover to 保存する oneself, and making 十分な use of 解雇する／砲火／射撃-力／強力にする to destroy the enemy) to the 原則s of 戦略 - are permeated with the spirit of this basic 原則. All technical 原則s and all 原則s 関心ing 策略, （選挙などの）運動をするs and 戦略 代表する 使用／適用s of this basic 原則. The 原則 of 保存するing oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all 軍の 原則s.

"Problems of 戦略 in ゲリラ兵 War Against Japan" (May 1938), Selected 作品,  Vol. II, pp. 81-82.*

Our 原則s of 操作／手術 are:

(1) Attack 分散させるd, 孤立するd enemy 軍隊s first; attack concentrated, strong enemy 軍隊s later.

(2) Take small and medium cities and 広範囲にわたる 田舎の areas first; take big cities later.

(3) Make wiping out the enemy's 効果的な strength our main 客観的な; do not make 持つ／拘留するing or 掴むing a city or place our main 客観的な. 持つ／拘留するing or 掴むing a city or place is the 結果 of wiping out the enemy's 効果的な strength, and often a city or place can be held or 掴むd for good only after it has changed 手渡すs a number of times.

(4) In every 戦う／戦い, concentrate an 絶対 superior 軍隊 (two, three, four and いつかs even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy 軍隊s 完全に, 努力する／競う to wipe them out 完全に and do not let any escape from the 逮捕する. In special circumstances, use the method of 取引，協定ing the enemy 鎮圧するing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his 側面に位置するs, with the 目的（とする） of wiping out one part and 大勝するing another so that our army can 速く move its 軍隊／機動隊s to 粉砕する other enemy 軍隊s. 努力する／競う to 避ける 戦う／戦いs of attrition in which we lose more than we 伸び（る） or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (ーに関して／ーの点でs of numbers), we shall be 絶対 superior in every part and every 明確な／細部 （選挙などの）運動をする, and this 確実にするs victoq in the （選挙などの）運動をする. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and 結局 wipe out all the enemy.

(5) Fight no 戦う／戦い unprepared, fight no 戦う／戦い you are not sure of winning; make every 成果／努力 to be 井戸／弁護士席 用意が出来ている for each 戦う／戦い, make every 成果／努力 to 確実にする victory in the given 始める，決める of 条件s as between the enemy and ourselves.

(6) Give 十分な play to our style of fighting - courage in 戦う／戦い, no 恐れる of sacrifice, no 恐れる of 疲労，（軍の）雑役, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting 連続する 戦う／戦いs in a short time without 残り／休憩（する）).

(7) 努力する／競う to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, 支払う／賃金 attention to the 策略 of positional attack and 逮捕（する） enemy 防備を堅める／強化するd points and cities.

(8) With regard to attacking cities, resolutely 掴む all enemy 防備を堅める／強化するd points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, 掴む all enemy 防備を堅める／強化するd points and cities defended with 穏健な strength, 供給するd circumstances 許す. As for all 堅固に defended enemy 防備を堅める／強化するd points and cities, wait till 条件s are 熟した and then take them.

(9) 補充する our strength with all the 武器 and most of the 職員／兵員 逮捕（する）d from the enemy. Our army's main sources of 動員可能数 and 軍需品 are at the 前線.

(10) Make good use of the intervals between （選挙などの）運動をするs to 残り／休憩（する）, train and 強固にする／合併する／制圧する our 軍隊／機動隊s. Periods of 残り／休憩（する）, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

These are the main methods the People's 解放 Army has 雇うd in 敗北・負かすing Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's 解放 Army in long years of fighting against 国内の and foreign enemies and are 完全に ふさわしい to our 現在の 状況／情勢. . . . our 戦略 and 策略 are based on a people's war; no army …に反対するd to the people can use our 戦略 and 策略.

"The 現在の 状況／情勢 and Our 仕事s" (December 25, 1947), Selected 軍の Writings,  2nd ed., pp. 349-50.*

Without preparedness 優越 is not real 優越 and there can be no 率先 either. Having しっかり掴むd this point, a 軍隊 which is inferior but 用意が出来ている can often 敗北・負かす a superior enemy by surprise attack.

"On 長引いた War" (May 1938), Selected 作品,  Vol. II, pp. 165-66.