Sect. I. Of the different 種類 of Philosophy

2. The other 種類 of philosophers considers man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active 存在, and endeavours to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a 支配する of 憶測; and with a 狭くする scrutiny 診察する it, ーするために find those 原則s, which 規制する our understanding, excite our 感情s, and make us 認可する or 非難する any particular 反対する, 活動／戦闘, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have 直す／買収する，八百長をするd, beyond 論争, the 創立／基礎 of morals, 推論する／理由ing, and 批評; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, 副／悪徳行為 and virtue, beauty and deformity, without 存在 able to 決定する the source of these distinctions. While they 試みる／企てる this arduous 仕事, they are deterred by no difficulties; but 訴訟／進行 from particular instances to general 原則s, they still 押し進める on their enquiries to 原則s more general, and 残り／休憩（する） not 満足させるd till they arrive at those 初めの 原則s, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their 憶測s seem abstract, and even unintelligible to ありふれた readers, they 目的（とする） at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves 十分に 補償するd for the 労働 of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may 与える／捧げる to the 指示／教授／教育 of posterity.

3. It is 確かな that the 平易な and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the 正確な and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into ありふれた life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those 原則s which actuate men, 改革（する）s their 行為／行う, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it 述べるs. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, 存在 設立するd on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into 商売／仕事 and 活動／戦闘, 消えるs when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its 原則s easily 保持する any 影響（力） over our 行為／行う and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its 結論s, and 減ずる the 深遠な philosopher to a mere plebeian.

4. This also must be 自白するd, that the most 持続する, 同様に as justest fame, has been acquired by the 平易な philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary 評判, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is 平易な for a 深遠な philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he 押し進めるs on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any 結論, by its unusual 外見, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who 目的s only to 代表する the ありふれた sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by 事故 he 落ちるs into error, goes no さらに先に; but 新たにするing his 控訴，上告 to ありふれた sense, and the natural 感情s of the mind, returns into the 権利 path, and 安全な・保証するs himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero 繁栄するs at 現在の; but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still 持続するs his 評判: But the glory of Malebranche is 限定するd to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with 楽しみ, when Locke shall be 完全に forgotten.

The mere philosopher is a character, which is 一般的に but little 許容できる in the world, as 存在 supposed to 与える／捧げる nothing either to the advantage or 楽しみ of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in 原則s and notions 平等に remote from their comprehension. On the other 手渡す, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is anything みなすd a surer 調印する of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences 繁栄する, than to be 完全に destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to 嘘（をつく） between those extremes; 保持するing an equal ability and taste for 調書をとる／予約するs, company, and 商売／仕事; 保存するing in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in 商売／仕事, that probity and 正確 which are the natural result of a just philosophy. ーするために diffuse and cultivate so 遂行するd a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the 平易な style and manner, which draw not too much from life, 要求する no 深い 使用／適用 or 退却／保養地 to be comprehended, and send 支援する the student の中で mankind 十分な of noble 感情s and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and 退職 entertaining.

Man is a reasonable 存在; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so 狭くする are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of 安全 or his 取得／買収s. Man is a sociable, no いっそう少なく than a reasonable 存在: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or 保存する the proper relish for them. Man is also an active 存在; and from that disposition, 同様に as from the さまざまな necessities of human life, must 服従させる／提出する to 商売／仕事 and 占領／職業: But the mind 要求するs some 緩和, and cannot always support its bent to care and 産業. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed 肉親，親類d of life as most suitable to the human race, and 内密に admonished them to 許す 非，不，無 of these biasses to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other 占領／職業s and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct 言及／関連 to 活動／戦闘 and society. Abstruse thought and 深遠な 研究s I 禁じる, and will 厳しく punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless 不確定 in which they 伴う／関わる you, and by the 冷淡な 歓迎会 which your pretended 発見s shall 会合，会う with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, まっただ中に all your philosophy, be still a man.

5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the 平易な philosophy to the abstract and 深遠な, without throwing any 非難する or contempt on the latter, it might not be 妥当でない, perhaps, to 従う with this general opinion, and 許す every man to enjoy, without 対立, his own taste and 感情. But as the 事柄 is often carried さらに先に, even to the 絶対の 拒絶するing of all 深遠な reasonings, or what is 一般的に called metaphysics, we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their に代わって.

We may begin with 観察するing, that one かなりの advantage, which results from the 正確な and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency to the 平易な and humane; which, without the former, can never 達成する a 十分な degree of exactness in its 感情s, precepts, or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in さまざまな 態度s and 状況／情勢s; and 奮起させる us with different 感情s, of 賞賛する or 非難する, 賞賛 or ridicule, によれば the 質s of the 反対する, which they 始める，決める before us. An artist must be better qualified to 後継する in this 請け負うing, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick 逮捕, 所有するs an 正確な knowledge of the 内部の fabric, the 操作／手術s of the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the さまざまな 種類 of 感情 which 差別する 副／悪徳行為 and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some 手段, requisite to those, who would 述べる with success the obvious and outward 外見s of life and manners. The anatomist 現在のs to the 注目する，もくろむ the most hideous and disagreeable 反対するs; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter 雇うs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his 人物／姿／数字s the most graceful and engaging 空気／公表するs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human 団体／死体, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and 人物／姿／数字 of every part or 組織／臓器. 正確 is, in every 事例／患者, advantageous to beauty, and just 推論する／理由ing to delicate 感情. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

Besides, we may 観察する, in every art or profession, even those which most 関心 life or 活動／戦闘, that a spirit of 正確, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and （判決などを）下すs them more subservient to the 利益／興味s of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from 商売／仕事, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must 徐々に diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a 類似の correctness on every art and calling. The 政治家，政治屋 will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in the subdividing and balancing of 力／強力にする; the lawyer more method and finer 原則s in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his discipline, and more 警告を与える in his 計画（する）s and 操作／手術s. The 安定 of modern 政府s above the 古代の, and the 正確 of modern philosophy, have 改善するd, and probably will still 改善する, by 類似の gradations.

6. Were there no advantage to be 得るd from these 熟考する／考慮するs, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be despised; as 存在 one 即位 to those few 安全な and 害のない 楽しみs, which are bestowed on the human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can either 除去する any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these 研究s may appear painful and 疲労，（軍の）雑役ing, it is with some minds as with some 団体／死体s, which 存在 endowed with vigorous and florid health, 要求する 厳しい 演習, and 得る a 楽しみ from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind 同様に as to the 注目する，もくろむ; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever 労働, must needs be delightful and rejoicing.

But this obscurity in the 深遠な and abstract philosophy, is 反対するd to, not only as painful and 疲労，（軍の）雑役ing, but as the 必然的な source of 不確定 and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible 反対 against a かなりの part of metaphysics, that they are not 適切に a science; but arise either from the fruitless 成果／努力s of human vanity, which would 侵入する into 支配するs utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the （手先の）技術 of popular superstitions, which, 存在 unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and 保護する their 証拠不十分. Chased from the open country, these robbers 飛行機で行く into the forest, and 嘘（をつく） in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and 圧倒する it with 宗教的な 恐れるs and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is 抑圧するd. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their 合法的な 君主s.

7. But is this a 十分な 推論する／理由, why philosophers should desist from such 研究s, and leave superstition still in 所有／入手 of her 退却／保養地? Is it not proper to draw an opposite 結論, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret 休会s of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from たびたび（訪れる） 失望, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper 州 of human 推論する／理由. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an 利益／興味 in perpetually 解任するing such topics; besides this, I say, the 動機 of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however 不成功の former 試みる／企てるs may have 証明するd, there is still room to hope, that the 産業, good fortune, or 改善するd sagacity of 後継するing 世代s may reach 発見s unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself 刺激するd, rather that discouraged, by the 失敗s of his 前任者s; while he hopes that the glory of 達成するing so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of 解放する／自由なing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire 本気で into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact 分析 of its 力／強力にするs and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse 支配するs. We must 服従させる／提出する to this 疲労，（軍の）雑役, ーするために live at 緩和する ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, ーするために destroy the 誤った and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a 保護（する）／緊急輸入制限 against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, 勝つ／広く一帯に広がるs, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and 期待s. 正確な and just 推論する／理由ing is the only 普遍的な 治療（薬）, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, 存在 mixed up with popular superstition, （判決などを）下すs it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the 空気／公表する of science and 知恵.

8. Besides this advantage of 拒絶するing, after 審議する／熟考する enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many 肯定的な advantages, which result from an 正確な scrutiny into the 力／強力にするs and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable 関心ing the 操作／手術s of the mind, that, though most intimately 現在の to us, yet, whenever they become the 反対する of reflexion, they seem 伴う／関わるd in obscurity; nor can the 注目する，もくろむ readily find those lines and 境界s, which 差別する and distinguish them. The 反対するs are too 罰金 to remain long in the same 面 or 状況／情勢; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior 侵入／浸透, derived from nature, and 改善するd by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different 操作／手術s of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper 長，率いるs, and to 訂正する all that seeming disorder, in which they 嘘（をつく） 伴う／関わるd, when made the 反対する of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and distinguishing, which has no 長所, when 成し遂げるd with regard to 外部の 団体／死体s, the 反対するs of our senses, rises in its value, when directed に向かって the 操作／手術s of the mind, in 割合 to the difficulty and 労働, which we 会合，会う with in 成し遂げるing it. And if we can go no さらに先に than this mental 地理学, or delineation of the 際立った parts and 力／強力にするs of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy.

Nor can there remain any 疑惑, that this science is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is 完全に 破壊分子 of all 憶測, and even 活動／戦闘. It cannot be 疑問d, that the mind is endowed with several 力／強力にするs and faculties, that these 力／強力にするs are 際立った from each other, that what is really 際立った to the 即座の perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and その結果, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this 支配する, and a truth and falsehood, which 嘘（をつく） not beyond the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this 肉親，親類d, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and passions, which 落ちる within the comprehension of every human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no いっそう少なく real and 確かな , though more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, 特に late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this 支店 of learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the 労働 of a philosopher to give us a true system of the 惑星s, and adjust the position and order of those remote 団体／死体s; while we 影響する／感情 to overlook those, who, with so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately 関心d?

9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its 研究s still さらに先に, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and 原則s, by which the human mind is actuated in its 操作／手術s? 天文学者s had long contented themselves with 証明するing, from the phaenomena, the true 動議s, order, and magnitude of the heavenly 団体／死体s: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest 推論する／理由ing, to have also 決定するd the 法律s and 軍隊s, by which the 革命s of the 惑星s are 治める／統治するd and directed. The like has been 成し遂げるd with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no 推論する／理由 to despair of equal success in our enquiries 関心ing the mental 力／強力にするs and economy, if 起訴するd with equal capacity and 警告を与える. It is probable, that one 操作／手術 and 原則 of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be 解決するd into one more general and 全世界の／万国共通の: And how far these 研究s may かもしれない be carried, it will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful 裁判，公判, 正確に／まさに to 決定する. This is 確かな , that 試みる／企てるs of this 肉親，親類d are every day made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with 徹底的な care and attention; that, if it 嘘（をつく） within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily 達成するd; if not, it may, however, be 拒絶するd with some 信用／信任 and 安全. This last 結論, surely, is not 望ましい; nor ought it to be embraced too rashly. For how much must we 減らす from the beauty and value of this 種類 of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the 広大な multitude and 多様制 of those 活動／戦闘s that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some ありふれた 原則, on which this variety of 感情s might depend. And though they have いつかs carried the 事柄 too far, by their passion for some one general 原則; it must, however, be 自白するd, that they are excusable in 推定する／予想するing to find some general 原則s, into which all the 副／悪徳行為s and virtues were 正確に，正当に to be 解決するd. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even 政治家，政治屋s: Nor have their 試みる／企てるs been wholly 不成功の; though perhaps longer time, greater 正確, and more ardent 使用／適用 may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this 肉親，親類d may 正確に，正当に be みなすd more 無分別な, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever 試みる／企てるd to 課す its 天然のまま dictates and 原則s on mankind.

10. What though these reasonings 関心ing human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and 深遠な philosophers can be very obvious and 平易な. And whatever 苦痛s these 研究s may cost us, we may think ourselves 十分に rewarded, not only in point of 利益（をあげる） but of 楽しみ, if, by that means, we can make any 新規加入 to our 在庫／株 of knowledge, in 支配するs of such unspeakable importance.

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these 憶測s is no 推薦, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the 避けるing of all unnecessary 詳細（に述べる）, we have, in the に引き続いて enquiry, 試みる／企てるd to throw some light upon 支配するs, from which 不確定 has hitherto deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can 部隊 the 境界s of the different 種類 of philosophy, by reconciling 深遠な enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, 推論する／理由ing in this 平易な manner, we can 土台を崩す the 創立／基礎s of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a 避難所 to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!

Sect. II. Of the Origin of Ideas

We may 観察する a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of 怒り／怒る, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his 状況／情勢; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we 反映する on our past 感情s and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its 反対するs truly; but the colours which it 雇うs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our 初めの perceptions were 着せる／賦与するd. It 要求するs no nice discernment or metaphysical 長，率いる to 示す the distinction between them.

12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or 種類, which are distinguished by their different degrees of 軍隊 and vivacity. The いっそう少なく forcible and lively are 一般的に denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other 種類 want a 指名する in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any, but philosophical 目的s, to 階級 them under a general 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 or 呼称. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impressions; 雇うing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or 願望（する）, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the いっそう少なく lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we 反映する on any of those sensations or movements above について言及するd.

13. Nothing, at first 見解（をとる）, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human 力／強力にする and 当局, but is not even 抑制するd within the 限界s of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous 形態／調整s and 外見s, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar 反対するs. And while the 団体／死体 is 限定するd to one 惑星, along which it creeps with 苦痛 and difficulty; the thought can in an instant 輸送（する） us into the most distant 地域s of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded 大混乱, where nature is supposed to 嘘（をつく） in total 混乱. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the 力／強力にする of thought, except what 暗示するs an 絶対の contradiction.

But though our thought seems to 所有する this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really 限定するd within very 狭くする 限界s, and that all this creative 力／強力にする of the mind 量s to no more than the faculty of 構内／化合物ing, transposing, augmenting, or 減らすing the 構成要素s afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two 一貫した ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were 以前は 熟知させるd. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may 部隊 to the 人物／姿／数字 and 形態／調整 of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the 構成要素s of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward 感情: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to 表明する myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.

14. To 証明する this, the two に引き続いて arguments will, I hope, be 十分な. First, when we 分析する our thoughts or ideas, however 構内／化合物d or sublime, we always find that they 解決する themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or 感情. Even those ideas, which, at first 見解（をとる）, seem the most wide of this origin, are 設立する, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good 存在, arises from 反映するing on the 操作／手術s of our own mind, and augmenting, without 限界, those 質s of goodness and 知恵. We may 起訴する this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we 診察する is copied from a 類似の impression. Those who would 主張する that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an 平易な method of 反駁するing it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be 現職の on us, if we would 持続する our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it.

15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the 組織／臓器, that a man is not susceptible of any 種類 of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the 特派員 ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. 回復する either of them that sense in which he is deficient; by 開始 this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these 反対するs. The 事例／患者 is the same, if the 反対する, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been 適用するd to the 組織／臓器. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of ワイン. And though there are few or no instances of a like 欠陥／不足 in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a 感情 or passion that belongs to his 種類; yet we find the same 観察 to take place in a いっそう少なく degree. A man of 穏やかな manners can form no idea of inveterate 復讐 or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive the 高さs of friendship and generosity. It is readily 許すd, that other 存在s may 所有する many senses of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have 接近 to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation.

16. There is, however, one contradictory 現象, which may 証明する that it is not 絶対 impossible for ideas to arise, 独立した・無所属 of their 特派員 impressions. I believe it will readily be 許すd, that the several 際立った ideas of colour, which enter by the 注目する，もくろむ, or those of sound, which are 伝えるd by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, 似ているing. Now if this be true of different colours, it must be no いっそう少なく so of the different shades of the same colour; and each shade produces a 際立った idea, 独立した・無所属 of the 残り／休憩（する）. For if this should be 否定するd, it is possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not 許す any of the means to be different, you cannot, without absurdity, 否定する the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly 熟知させるd with colours of all 肉親，親類d except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to 会合，会う with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that 選び出す／独身 one, be placed before him, descending 徐々に from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to 供給（する） this 欠陥／不足, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been 伝えるd to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the 特派員 impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely 価値（がある） our 観察するing, and does not 長所 that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.

17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might （判決などを）下す every 論争 平等に intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken 所有／入手 of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn 不名誉 upon them. All ideas, 特に abstract ones, are 自然に faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender 持つ／拘留する of them: they are apt to be confounded with other 似ているing ideas; and when we have often 雇うd any 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語, though without a 際立った meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea 別館d to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: the 限界s between them are more 正確に／まさに 決定するd: nor is it 平易な to 落ちる into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any 疑惑 that a philosophical 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 is 雇うd without any meaning or idea (as is but too たびたび（訪れる）), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to 割り当てる any, this will serve to 確認する our 疑惑. By bringing ideas into so （疑いを）晴らす a light we may reasonably hope to 除去する all 論争, which may arise, 関心ing their nature and reality.*
[* It is probable that no more was meant by those, who 否定するd innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be 自白するd, that the 条件, which they 雇うd, were not chosen with such 警告を与える, nor so 正確に／まさに defined, as to 妨げる all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be 同等（の） to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be 許すd to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in 対立 to what is uncommon, 人工的な, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, 同時代の to our birth, the 論争 seems to be frivolous; nor is it 価値（がある） while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be 一般的に taken in a very loose sense, by Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, 同様に as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should 願望（する） to know, what can be meant by 主張するing, that self-love, or 憤慨 of 傷害s, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?
But admitting these 条件, impressions and ideas, in the sense above explained, and understanding by innate, what is 初めの or copied from no precedent perception, then may we 主張する that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.]

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that Locke was betrayed into this question by the Schoolmen, who, making use of undefined 条件, draw out their 論争s to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that Philosopher's reasonings on this 同様に as most other 支配するs.

Sect. III. Of the 協会 of Ideas

19. Though it be too obvious to escape 観察, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has 試みる／企てるd to enumerate or class all the 原則s of 協会; a 支配する, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three 原則s of connexion の中で ideas, すなわち, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and 原因（となる） or 影響.

That these 原則s serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much 疑問d. A picture 自然に leads our thoughts to the 初めの:* the について言及する of one apartment in a building 自然に introduces an enquiry or discourse 関心ing the others:** and if we think of a 負傷させる, we can scarcely forbear 反映するing on the 苦痛 which follows it.*** But that this enumeration is 完全にする, and that there are no other 原則s of 協会 except these, may be difficult to 証明する to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do, in such 事例／患者s, is to run over several instances, and 診察する carefully the 原則 which 貯蔵所d the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we （判決などを）下す the 原則 as general as possible.**** The more instances we 診察する, and the more care we 雇う, the more 保証／確信 shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is 完全にする and entire.
[* Resemblance.]
[** Contiguity.]
[*** 原因（となる） and 影響.]
[**** For instance Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion の中で Ideas: but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance. Where two 反対するs are contrary, the one destroys the other; that is, the 原因（となる） of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an 反対する, 暗示するs the idea of its former 存在.]

Sect. IV. 懐疑的な 疑問s 関心ing the 操作／手術s of the Understanding

Part I.

21. 事柄s of fact, which are the second 反対するs of human 推論する／理由, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our 証拠 of their truth, however 広大な／多数の／重要な, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every 事柄 of fact is still possible; because it can never 暗示する a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same 施設 and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no いっそう少なく intelligible a proposition, and 暗示するs no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, 試みる／企てる to 論証する its falsehood. Were it demonstratively 誤った, it would 暗示する a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

It may, therefore, be a 支配する worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that 証拠 which 保証するs us of any real 存在 and 事柄 of fact, beyond the 現在の 証言 of our senses, or the 記録，記録的な／記録するs of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the 古代のs or moderns; and therefore our 疑問s and errors, in the 起訴 of so important an enquiry, may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even 証明する useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying that implicit 約束 and 安全, which is the 禁止（する） of all 推論する／理由ing and 解放する／自由な enquiry. The 発見 of defects in the ありふれた philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I 推定する, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to 試みる／企てる something more 十分な and 満足な than has yet been 提案するd to the public.

22. All reasonings 関心ing 事柄 of fact seem to be 設立するd on the realtion of 原因（となる） and 影響. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the 証拠 of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any 事柄 of fact, which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in フラン; he would give you a 推論する／理由; and this 推論する／理由 would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former 決意／決議s and 約束s. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a 砂漠 island, would 結論する that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings 関心ing fact are of the same nature. And here it is 絶えず supposed that there is a connexion between the 現在の fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to 貯蔵所d them together, the inference would be 完全に 不安定な. The 審理，公聴会 of an articulate 発言する／表明する and 合理的な／理性的な discourse in the dark 保証するs us of the presence of some person: Why? because these are the 影響s of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are 設立するd on the relation of 原因（となる） and 影響, and that this relation is either 近づく or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral 影響s of 解雇する／砲火／射撃, and the one 影響 may 正確に，正当に be inferred from the other.

23. If we would 満足させる ourselves, therefore, 関心ing the nature of that 証拠, which 保証するs us of 事柄s of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of 原因（となる） and 影響.

I shall 投機・賭ける to 断言する, as a general proposition, which 収容する／認めるs of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, 達成するd by reasonings a priori; but arises 完全に from experience, when we find that any particular 反対するs are 絶えず conjoined with each other. Let an 反対する be 現在のd to a man of ever so strong natural 推論する／理由 and abilities; if that 反対する be 完全に new to him, he will not be able, by the most 正確な examination of its sensible 質s, to discover any of its 原因（となる）s or 影響s. Adam, though his 合理的な／理性的な faculties be supposed, at the very first, 完全に perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would 窒息させる him, or from the light and warmth of 解雇する／砲火／射撃 that it would 消費する him. No 反対する ever discovers, by the 質s which appear to the senses, either the 原因（となる）s which produced it, or the 影響s which will arise from it; nor can our 推論する／理由, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference 関心ing real 存在 and 事柄 of fact.

24. This proposition, that 原因（となる）s and 影響s are discoverable, not by 推論する／理由 but by experience, will readily be 認める with regard to such 反対するs, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter 無（不）能, which we then lay under, of foretelling what would arise from them. 現在の two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never discover that they will 固執する together in such a manner as to 要求する 広大な／多数の／重要な 軍隊 to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a 抵抗 to a lateral 圧力. Such events, as 耐える little analogy to the ありふれた course of nature, are also readily 自白するd to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that the 爆発 of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments a priori. In like manner, when an 影響 is supposed to depend upon an intricate 機械／機構 or secret structure of parts, we make no difficulty in せいにするing all our knowledge of it to experience. Who will 主張する that he can give the ultimate 推論する／理由, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tiger?

But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same 証拠 with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first 外見 in the world, which 耐える a の近くに analogy to the whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple 質s of 反対するs, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these 影響s by the mere 操作／手術 of our 推論する／理由, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one billiard-ball would communicate 動議 to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, ーするために pronounce with certainty 関心ing it. Such is the 影響（力） of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even 隠すs itself, and seems not to take place, 単に because it is 設立する in the highest degree.

25. But to 納得させる us that all the 法律s of nature, and all the 操作／手術s of 団体／死体s without exception, are known only by experience, the に引き続いて reflections may, perhaps, 十分である. Were any 反対する 現在のd to us, and were we 要求するd to pronounce 関心ing the 影響, which will result from it, without 協議するing past 観察; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this 操作／手術? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the 反対する as its 影響; and it is plain that this 発明 must be 完全に 独断的な. The mind can never かもしれない find the 影響 in the supposed 原因（となる）, by the most 正確な scrutiny and examination. For the 影響 is 全く different from the 原因（となる）, and その結果 can never be discovered in it. 動議 in the second billiard-ball is a やめる 際立った event from 動議 in the first; nor is there anything in the one to 示唆する the smallest hint of the other. A 石／投石する or piece of metal raised into the 空気／公表する, and left without any support, すぐに 落ちるs: but to consider the 事柄 a priori, is there anything we discover in this 状況／情勢 which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an 上向き, or any other 動議, in the 石／投石する or metal?

And as the first imagination or 発明 of a particular 影響, in all natural 操作／手術s, is 独断的な, where we 協議する not experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the 原因（となる） and 影響, which 貯蔵所d them together, and （判決などを）下すs it impossible that any other 影響 could result from the 操作／手術 of that 原因（となる）. When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a straight line に向かって another; even suppose 動議 in the second ball should by 事故 be 示唆するd to me, as the result of their 接触する or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might 同様に follow from that 原因（となる）? May not both these balls remain at 絶対の 残り／休憩（する）? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are 一貫した and 考えられる. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more 一貫した or 考えられる than the 残り／休憩（する）? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any 創立／基礎 for this preference.

In a word, then, every 影響 is a 際立った event from its 原因（となる）. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the 原因（となる）, and the first 発明 or conception of it, a priori, must be 完全に 独断的な. And even after it is 示唆するd, the 合同 of it with the 原因（となる） must appear 平等に 独断的な; since there are always many other 影響s, which, to 推論する／理由, must seem fully as 一貫した and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to 決定する any 選び出す／独身 event, or infer any 原因（となる） or 影響, without the 援助 of 観察 and experience.

26. Hence we may discover the 推論する／理由 why no philosopher, who is 合理的な／理性的な and modest, has ever pretended to 割り当てる the ultimate 原因（となる） of any natural 操作／手術, or to show distinctly the 活動／戦闘 of that 力／強力にする, which produces any 選び出す／独身 影響 in the universe. It is 自白するd, that the 最大の 成果／努力 of human 推論する／理由 is to 減ずる the 原則s, 生産力のある of natural phenomena, to a greater 簡単, and to 解決する the many particular 影響s into a few general 原因（となる）s, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and 観察. But as to the 原因（となる）s of these general 原因（となる）s, we should in vain 試みる／企てる their 発見; nor shall we ever be able to 満足させる ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and 原則s are 全く shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of 動議 by impulse; these are probably the ultimate 原因（となる）s and 原則s which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves 十分に happy, if, by 正確な enquiry and 推論する／理由ing, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or 近づく to, these general 原則s. The most perfect philosophy of the natural 肉親，親類d only 突き破るs off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical 肉親，親類d serves only to discover larger 部分s of it. Thus the 観察 of human blindness and 証拠不十分 is the result of all philosophy, and 会合，会うs us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or 避ける it.

27. Nor is geometry, when taken into the 援助 of natural philosophy, ever able to 治療（薬） this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate 原因（となる）s, by all that 正確 of 推論する／理由ing for which it is so 正確に，正当に celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that 確かな 法律s are 設立するd by nature in her 操作／手術s; and abstract reasonings are 雇うd, either to 補助装置 experience in the 発見 of these 法律s, or to 決定する their 影響（力） in particular instances, where it depends upon any 正確な degree of distance and 量. Thus, it is a 法律 of 動議, discovered by experience, that the moment or 軍隊 of any 団体／死体 in 動議 is in the 構内／化合物 割合 or 割合 of its solid contents and its velocity; and その結果, that a small 軍隊 may 除去する the greatest 障害 or raise the greatest 負わせる, if, by any contrivance or 機械／機構, we can 増加する the velocity of that 軍隊, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry 補助装置s us in the 使用／適用 of this 法律, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and 人物／姿／数字s which can enter into any 種類 of machine; but still the 発見 of the 法律 itself is 借りがあるing 単に to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step に向かって the knowledge of it. When we 推論する／理由 a priori, and consider 単に any 反対する or 原因（となる）, as it appears to the mind, 独立した・無所属 of all 観察, it never could 示唆する to us the notion of any 際立った 反対する, such as its 影響; much いっそう少なく, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by 推論する／理由ing that 水晶 is the 影響 of heat, and ice of 冷淡な, without 存在 以前 熟知させるd with the 操作／手術 of these 質s.

Part II.

I shall content myself, in this section, with an 平易な 仕事, and shall pretend only to give a 消極的な answer to the question here 提案するd. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the 操作／手術s of 原因（となる） and 影響, our 結論s from that experience are not 設立するd on 推論する／理由ing, or any 過程 of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

29. It must certainly be 許すd, that nature has kept us at a 広大な／多数の／重要な distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial 質s of 反対するs; while she 隠すs from us those 力／強力にするs and 原則s on which the 影響（力） of those 反対するs 完全に depends. Our senses 知らせる us of the colour, 負わせる, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor 推論する／理由 can ever 知らせる us of those 質s which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human 団体／死体. Sight or feeling 伝えるs an idea of the actual 動議 of 団体／死体s; but as to that wonderful 軍隊 or 力／強力にする, which would carry on a moving 団体／死体 for ever in a continued change of place, and which 団体／死体s never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural 力／強力にするs* and 原則s, we always 推定する, when we see like sensible 質s, that they have like secret 力／強力にするs, and 推定する／予想する that 影響s, 類似の to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a 団体／死体 of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have 以前は eat, be 現在のd to us, we make no scruple of repeating the 実験, and 予知する, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a 過程 of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the 創立／基礎. It is 許すd on all 手渡すs that there is no known connexion between the sensible 質s and the secret 力／強力にするs; and その結果, that the mind is not led to form such a 結論 関心ing their constant and 正規の／正選手 合同, by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be 許すd to give direct and 確かな （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状） of those 正確な 反対するs only, and that 正確な period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be 延長するd to 未来 times, and to other 反対するs, which for aught we know, may be only in 外見 類似の; this is the main question on which I would 主張する. The bread, which I 以前は eat , nourished me; that is, a 団体／死体 of such sensible 質s was, at that time, endued with such secret 力／強力にするs: but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible 質s must always be …に出席するd with like secret 力／強力にするs? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be 定評のある that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a 確かな step taken; a 過程 of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from 存在 the same, I have 設立する that such an 反対する has always been …に出席するd with such an 影響, and I 予知する, that other 反対するs, which are, in 外見, 類似の, will be …に出席するd with 類似の 影響s. I shall 許す, if you please, that the one proposition may 正確に，正当に be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you 主張する that the inference is made by a chain of 推論する／理由ing, I 願望（する） you to produce that 推論する／理由ing. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is 要求するd a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by 推論する／理由ing and argument. What that medium is, I must 自白する, passes my comprehension; and it is 現職の on those to produce it, who 主張する that it really 存在するs, and is the origin of all our 結論s 関心ing 事柄 of fact.
[* The word, 力／強力にする, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more 正確な explication of it would give 付加 証拠 to this argument. See Sect. 7. ]

30. This 消極的な argument must certainly, in 過程 of time, become altogether 納得させるing, if many 侵入するing and able philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or 中間の step, which supports the understanding in this 結論. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not 信用 so far to his own 侵入／浸透, as to 結論する, because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not really 存在する. For this 推論する／理由 it may be requisite to 投機・賭ける upon a more difficult 仕事; and enumerating all the 支店s of human knowledge, endeavour to show that 非，不，無 of them can afford such an argument.

All reasonings may be divided into two 肉親，親類d, すなわち, demonstrative 推論する／理由ing, or that 関心ing relations of ideas, and moral 推論する／理由ing, or that 関心ing 事柄 of fact and 存在. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the 事例／患者 seems evident; since it 暗示するs no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an 反対する, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be …に出席するd with different or contrary 影響s. May I not 明確に and distinctly conceive that a 団体／死体, 落ちるing from the clouds, and which, in all other 尊敬（する）・点s, 似ているs snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of 解雇する／砲火／射撃? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to 断言する, that all the trees will 繁栄する in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, 暗示するs no contradiction, and can never be 証明するd 誤った by any demonstrative argument or abstract 推論する／理由ing a priori.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put 信用 in past experience, and make it the 基準 of our 未来 裁判／判断, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard 事柄 of fact and real 存在, によれば the 分割 above について言及するd. But that there is no argument of this 肉親，親類d, must appear, if our explication of that 種類 of 推論する／理由ing be 認める as solid and 満足な. We have said that all arguments 関心ing 存在 are 設立するd on the relation of 原因（となる） and 影響; that our knowledge of that relation is derived 完全に from experience; and that all our 実験の 結論s proceed upon the supposition that the 未来 will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding 存在, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for 認めるd, which is the very point in question.

31. In reality, all arguments from experience are 設立するd on the similarity which we discover の中で natural 反対するs, and by which we are induced to 推定する／予想する 影響s 類似の to those which we have 設立する to follow from such 反対するs. And though 非，不，無 but a fool or madman will ever pretend to 論争 the 当局 of experience, or to 拒絶する that 広大な／多数の／重要な guide of human life, it may surely be 許すd a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to 診察する the 原則 of human nature, which gives this mighty 当局 to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed の中で different 反対するs. From 原因（となる）s which appear 類似の we 推定する／予想する 類似の 影響s. This is the sum of all our 実験の 結論s. Now it seems evident that, if this 結論 were formed by 推論する／理由, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience. But the 事例／患者 is far さもなければ. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, 推定する／予想するs the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform 実験s in any 肉親，親類d, that we 達成する a 会社／堅い 依存 and 安全 with regard to a particular event. Now where is that 過程 of 推論する／理由ing which, from one instance, draws a 結論, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that 選び出す／独身 one? This question I 提案する as much for the sake of （警察などへの）密告，告訴（状）, as with an 意向 of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such 推論する／理由ing. But I keep my mind still open to 指示／教授／教育, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform 実験s, we infer a connexion between the sensible 質s and the secret 力／強力にするs; this, I must 自白する, seems the same difficulty, couched in different 条件. The question still recurs, on what 過程 of argument this inference is 設立するd? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is 自白するd that the colour, consistence, and other sensible 質s of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret 力／強力にするs of nourishment and support. For さもなければ we could infer these secret 力／強力にするs from the first 外見 of these sensible 質s, without the 援助（する） of experience; contrary to the 感情 of all philosophers, and contrary to plain 事柄 of fact. Here, then, is our natural 明言する／公表する of ignorance with regard to the 力／強力にするs and 影響（力） of all 反対するs. How is this 治療（薬）d by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform 影響s, resulting from 確かな 反対するs, and teaches us that those particular 反対するs, at that particular time, were endowed with such 力／強力にするs and 軍隊s. When a new 反対する, endowed with 類似の sensible 質s, is produced, we 推定する／予想する 類似の 力／強力にするs and 軍隊s, and look for a like 影響. From a 団体／死体 of like colour and consistence with bread we 推定する／予想する like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or 進歩 of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, I have 設立する, in all past instances, such sensible 質s conjoined with such secret 力／強力にするs; And when he says, 類似の sensible 質s will always be conjoined with 類似の secret 力／強力にするs, he is not 有罪の of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any 尊敬（する）・点 the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must 自白する that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is 実験の, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundati on, that the 未来 will 似ている the past, and that 類似の 力／強力にするs will be conjoined with 類似の sensible 質s. If there be any 疑惑 that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no 支配する for the 未来, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or 結論. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can 証明する this resemblance of the past to the 未来; since all these arguments are 設立するd on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be 許すd hitherto ever so 正規の／正選手; that alone, without some new argument or inference, 証明するs not that, for the 未来, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of 団体／死体s from your past experience. Their secret nature, and その結果 all their 影響s and 影響（力）, may change, without any change in their sensible 質s. This happens いつかs, and with regard to some 反対するs: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all 反対するs? What logic, what 過程 of argument 安全な・保証するs you against this supposition? My practice, you say, 反駁するs my 疑問s. But you mistake the 趣旨 of my question. As an スパイ／執行官, I am やめる 満足させるd in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some 株 of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the 創立／基礎 of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to 除去する my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a 事柄 of such importance. Can I do better than 提案する the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of 得るing a 解答? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

33. I must 自白する that a man is 有罪の of unpardonable arrogance who 結論するs, because an argument has escaped his own 調査, that therefore it does not really 存在する. I must also 自白する that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have 雇うd themselves in fruitless search upon any 支配する, it may still, perhaps, be 無分別な to 結論する 前向きに／確かに that the 支配する must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we 診察する all the sources of our knowledge, and 結論する them unfit for such a 支配する, there may still remain a 疑惑, that the enumeration is not 完全にする, or the examination not 正確な. But with regard to the 現在の 支配する, there are some considerations which seem to 除去する all this 告訴，告発 of arrogance or 疑惑 of mistake.

It is 確かな that the most ignorant and stupid 小作農民s- nay 幼児s, nay even brute beasts- 改善する by experience, and learn the 質s of natural 反対するs, by 観察するing the 影響s which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of 苦痛 from touching the 炎上 of a candle, he will be careful not to put his 手渡す 近づく any candle; but will 推定する／予想する a 類似の 影響 from a 原因（となる） which is 類似の in its sensible 質s and 外見. If you 主張する, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this 結論 by any 過程 of argument or ratiocination, I may 正確に，正当に 要求する you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to 辞退する so equitable a 需要・要求する. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may かもしれない escape your enquiry; since you 自白する that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere 幼児. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or 深遠な argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and 自白する that it is not 推論する／理由ing which engages us to suppose the past 似ているing the 未来, and to 推定する／予想する 類似の 影響s from 原因（となる）s which are, to 外見, 類似の. This is the proposition which I ーするつもりであるd to 施行する in the 現在の section. If I be 権利, I pretend not to have made any mighty 発見. And if I be wrong, I must 認める myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

Sect. V. 懐疑的な 解答 of these 疑問s

Part I.

Nor need we 恐れる that this philosophy, while it endeavours to 限界 our enquiries to ありふれた life, should ever 土台を崩す the reasonings of ありふれた life, and carry its 疑問s so far as to destroy all 活動／戦闘, 同様に as 憶測. Nature will always 持続する her 権利s, and 勝つ／広く一帯に広がる in the end over any abstract 推論する／理由ing どれでも. Though we should 結論する, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or 過程 of the understanding; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be 影響する／感情d by such a 発見. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other 原則 of equal 負わせる and 当局; and that 原則 will 保存する its 影響（力） as long as human nature remains the same. What that 原則 is may 井戸／弁護士席 be 価値（がある） the 苦痛s of enquiry.

35. Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of 推論する／理由 and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, すぐに 観察する a continual succession of 反対するs, and one event に引き続いて another; but he would not be able to discover anything さらに先に. He would not, at first, by any 推論する／理由ing, be able to reach the idea of 原因（となる） and 影響; since the particular 力／強力にするs, by which all natural 操作／手術s are 成し遂げるd, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to 結論する, 単に because one event, in one instance, に先行するs another, that therefore the one is the 原因（となる）, the other the 影響. Their 合同 may be 独断的な and casual. There may be no 推論する／理由 to infer the 存在 of one from the 外見 of the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never 雇う his conjecture or 推論する／理由ing 関心ing any 事柄 of fact, or be 保証するd of anything beyond what was すぐに 現在の to his memory and senses.

Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have 観察するd familiar 反対するs or events to be 絶えず conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience? He すぐに infers the 存在 of one 反対する from the 外見 of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret 力／強力にする by which the one 反対する produces the other; nor is it, by any 過程 of 推論する／理由ing, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself 決定するd to draw it: And though he should be 納得させるd that his understanding has no part in the 操作／手術, he would にもかかわらず continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other 原則 which 決定するs him to form such a 結論.

36. This 原則 is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular 行為／法令／行動する or 操作／手術 produces a propensity to 新たにする the same 行為／法令／行動する or 操作／手術, without 存在 impelled by any 推論する／理由ing or 過程 of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the 影響 of Custom. By 雇うing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate 推論する／理由 of such a propensity. We only point out a 原則 of human nature, which is universally 定評のある, and which is 井戸／弁護士席 known by its 影響s. Perhaps we can 押し進める our enquiries no さらに先に, or pretend to give the 原因（となる） of this 原因（となる）; but must 残り／休憩（する） contented with it as the ultimate 原則, which we can 割り当てる, of all our 結論s from experience. It is 十分な satisfaction, that we can go so far, without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will carry us no さらに先に. And it is 確かな we here 前進する a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we 主張する that, after the constant 合同 of two 反対するs- heat and 炎上, for instance, 負わせる and solidity- we are 決定するd by custom alone to 推定する／予想する the one from the 外見 of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no 尊敬（する）・点, different from them. 推論する／理由 is incapable of any such variation. The 結論s which it draws from considering one circle are the same which it would form upon 調査するing all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one 団体／死体 move after 存在 impelled by another, could infer that every other 団体／死体 will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are 影響s of custom, not of 推論する／理由ing.*
[* Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on moral, political, or physical 支配するs, to distinguish between 推論する／理由 and experience, and to suppose, that these 種類 of argumentation are 完全に different from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our 知識人 faculties, which, by considering priori the nature of things, and 診察するing the 影響s, that must follow from their 操作／手術, 設立する particular 原則s of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived 完全に from sense and 観察, by which we learn what has 現実に resulted from the 操作／手術 of particular 反対するs, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the 未来, result from them. Thus, for instance, the 制限s and 抑制s of civil 政府, and a 合法的な 憲法, may be defended, either from 推論する／理由, which 反映するing on the 広大な／多数の／重要な frailty and 汚職 of human nature, teaches, that no man can 安全に be 信用d with 制限のない 当局; or from experience and history, which 知らせる us of the enormous 乱用s, that ambition, in every age and country, has been 設立する to make of so imprudent a 信用／信任.]

The same distinction between 推論する／理由 and experience is 持続するd in all our 審議s 関心ing the 行為／行う of life; while the experienced 政治家, general, 内科医, or merchant is 信用d and followed; and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Though it be 許すd, that 推論する／理由 may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular 行為／行う in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imperfect, without the 援助 of experience, which is alone able to give 安定 and certainty to the maxims, derived from 熟考する／考慮する and reflection.

But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received, both in the active 思索的な scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at 底（に届く）, erroneous, at least, superficial.

If we 診察する those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above について言及するd, are supposed to be mere 影響s of 推論する／理由ing and reflection, they will be 設立する to 終結させる, at last, in some general 原則 or 結論, for which we can 割り当てる no 推論する／理由 but 観察 and experience. The only difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be 設立するd without some 過程 of thought, and some reflection on what we have 観察するd, ーするために distinguish its circumstances, and trace its consequences: 反して in the latter, the experienced event is 正確に／まさに and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular 状況／情勢. The history of a Tiberius or a Nero makes us dread a like tyranny, were our 君主s 解放する／自由なd from the 抑制s of 法律s and 上院s: But the 観察 of any 詐欺 or cruelty in 私的な life is 十分な, with the 援助（する） of a little thought, to give us the same 逮捕; while it serves as an instance of the general 汚職 of human nature, and shows us the danger which we must 背負い込む by reposing an entire 信用／信任 in mankind. In both 事例／患者s, it is experience which is 最終的に the 創立／基礎 of our inference and 結論.

There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed, from 観察, many general and just maxims 関心ing human 事件／事情／状勢s and the 行為／行う of life; but it must be 自白するd, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be 極端に liable to error, till time and さらに先に experience both 大きくする these maxims, and teach him their proper use and 使用／適用. In every 状況／情勢 or 出来事/事件, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the justness of his 結論s, and その結果 the prudence of his 行為／行う, 完全に depend. Not to について言及する, that, to a young beginner, the general 観察s and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be すぐに 適用するd with 予定 calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he 絶対 unexperienced; and when we 割り当てる that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him 所有するd of experience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree.

Custom, then, is the 広大な／多数の／重要な guide of human life. It is that 原則 alone which （判決などを）下すs our experience useful to us, and makes us 推定する／予想する, for the 未来, a 類似の train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the 影響（力） of custom, we should be 完全に ignorant of every 事柄 of fact beyond what is すぐに 現在の to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to 雇う our natural 力／強力にするs in the 生産／産物 of any 影響. There would be an end at once of all 活動／戦闘, 同様に as of the 長，指導者 part of 憶測.

37. But here it may be proper to 発言／述べる, that though our 結論s from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and 保証する us of 事柄s of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be 現在の to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in 製図／抽選 these 結論s. A man, who should find in a 砂漠 country the remains of pompous buildings, would 結論する that the country had, in 古代の times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the 容積／容量s in which this 指示／教授／教育 is 含む／封じ込めるd, and thence carry up our inferences from one 証言 to another, till we arrive at the 目撃者s and 観客s of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, 現在の to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be 単に hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real 存在. If I ask why you believe any particular 事柄 of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some 推論する／理由; and this 推論する／理由 will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last 終結させる in some fact, which is 現在の to your memory or senses; or must 許す that your belief is 完全に without 創立／基礎.

38. What, then, is the 結論 of the whole 事柄? A simple one; though, it must be 自白するd, pretty remote from the ありふれた theories of philosophy. All belief of 事柄 of fact or real 存在 is derived 単に from some 反対する, 現在の to the memory or senses, and a customary 合同 between that and some other 反対する. Or in other words; having 設立する, in many instances, that any two 肉親，親類d of 反対するs- 炎上 and heat, snow and 冷淡な- have always been conjoined together; if 炎上 or snow be 現在のd もう一度 to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to 推定する／予想する heat or 冷淡な, and to believe that such a 質 does 存在する, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an 操作／手術 of the soul, when we are so 据えるd, as 避けられない as to feel the passion of love, when we receive 利益s; or 憎悪, when we 会合，会う with 傷害s. All these 操作／手術s are a 種類 of natural instincts, which no 推論する／理由ing or 過程 of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to 妨げる.

At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical 研究s. In most questions we can never make a 選び出す／独身 step その上の; and in all questions we must 終結させる here at last, after our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still さらに先に 研究s, and make us 診察する more 正確に the nature of this belief, and of the customary 合同, whence it is derived. By this means we may 会合，会う with some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with 憶測s, which, however 正確な, may still 保持する a degree of 疑問 and 不確定. As to readers of a different taste; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them, and the に引き続いて enquiries may 井戸／弁護士席 be understood, though it be neglected.

Part II.

It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some 感情 or feeling, which is 別館d to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be 命令（する）d at 楽しみ. It must be excited by nature, like all other 感情s; and must arise from the particular 状況／情勢, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any 反対する is 現在のd to the memory or senses, it すぐに, by the 軍隊 of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that 反対する, which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is …に出席するd with a feeling or 感情, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no 事柄 of fact which we believe so 堅固に that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which is 拒絶するd, were it not for some 感情 which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving に向かって another, on a smooth （米）棚上げする／（英）提議する, I can easily conceive it to stop upon 接触する. This conception 暗示するs no contradiction; but still it feels very 異なって from that conception by which I 代表する to myself the impulse and the communication of 動議 from one ball to another.

40. Were we to 試みる／企てる a 鮮明度／定義 of this 感情, we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible 仕事; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of 冷淡な or passion of 怒り／怒る, to a creature who never had any experience of these 感情s. Belief is the true and proper 指名する of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語; because every man is every moment conscious of the 感情 代表するd by it. It may not, however, be 妥当でない to 試みる／企てる a description of this 感情; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may afford a more perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, 会社／堅い, 安定した conception of an 反対する, than what the imagination alone is ever able to 達成する. This variety of 条件, which may seem so unphilosophical, is ーするつもりであるd only to 表明する that 行為／法令／行動する of the mind, which （判決などを）下すs realities, or what is taken for such, more 現在の to us than fictions, 原因（となる）s them to 重さを計る more in the thought, and gives them a superior 影響（力） on the passions and imagination. 供給するd we agree about the thing, it is needless to 論争 about the 条件. The imagination has the 命令（する） over all its ideas, and can join and mix and 変化させる them, in all the ways possible. It may conceive fictitious 反対するs with all the circumstances of place and time. It may 始める，決める them, in a manner, before our 注目する，もくろむs, in their true colours, just as they might have 存在するd. But as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. I 自白する, that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words which 表明する something 近づく it. But its true and proper 指名する, as we 観察するd before, is belief; which is a 称する，呼ぶ／期間／用語 that every one 十分に understand s in ありふれた life. And in philosophy, we can go no さらに先に than 主張する, that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the 裁判／判断 from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more 負わせる and 影響（力）; makes them appear of greater importance; 施行するs them in the mind; and （判決などを）下すs them the 治める／統治するing 原則 of our 活動／戦闘s. I hear at 現在の, for instance, a person's 発言する／表明する, with whom I am 熟知させるd; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses すぐに 伝えるs my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding 反対するs. I paint them out to myself as 存在するing at 現在の, with the same 質s and relations, of which I 以前は knew them 所有するd. These ideas take faster 持つ／拘留する of my mind than ideas of an enchanted 城. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater 影響（力） of every 肉親，親類d, either to give 楽しみ or 苦痛, joy or 悲しみ.

Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and 許す, that the 感情 of belief is nothing but a conception more 激しい and 安定した than what …に出席するs the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this manner of conception arises from a customary 合同 of the 反対する with something 現在の to the memory or senses: I believe that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other 操作／手術s of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to 原則s still more general.

41. We have already 観察するd that nature has 設立するd connexions の中で particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention に向かって it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These 原則s of connexion or 協会 we have 減ずるd to three, すなわち, Resemblance, Contiguity and Causation; which are the only 社債s that 部隊 our thoughts together, and beget that 正規の／正選手 train of reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or いっそう少なく degree, takes place の中で all mankind. Now here arises a question, on which the 解答 of the 現在の difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the 反対するs is 現在のd to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what さもなければ it would have been able to 達成する? This seems to be the 事例／患者 with that belief which arises from the relation of 原因（となる） and 影響. And if the 事例／患者 be the same with the other relations or 原則s of 協会s, this may be 設立するd as a general 法律, which takes place in all the 操作／手術s of the mind.

We may, therefore, 観察する, as the first 実験 to our 現在の 目的, that, upon the 外見 of the picture of an absent friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance, and that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or 悲しみ, acquires new 軍隊 and vigour. In producing this 影響, there 同意する both a relation and a 現在の impression. Where the picture 耐えるs him no resemblance, at least was not ーするつもりであるd for him, it never so much as 伝えるs our thought to him: And where it is absent, 同様に as the person, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other, it feels its idea to be rather 弱めるd than enlivened by that 移行. We take a 楽しみ in 見解（をとる）ing the picture of a friend, when it is 始める，決める before us; but when it is 除去するd, rather choose to consider him 直接／まっすぐに than by reflection in an image, which is 平等に distant and obscure.

The 儀式s of the Roman カトリック教徒 宗教 may be considered as instances of the same nature. The 充てるs of that superstition usually 嘆願d in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good 影響 of those 外部の 動議s, and postures, and 活動／戦闘s, in enlivening their devotion and 生き返らせる their fervour, which さもなければ would decay, if directed 完全に to distant and immaterial 反対するs. We 影をつくる／尾行する out the 反対するs of our 約束, say they, in sensible types and images, and （判決などを）下す them more 現在の to us by the 即座の presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do 単に by an 知識人 見解（をとる） and contemplation. Sensible 反対するs have always a greater 影響（力） on the fancy than any other; and this 影響（力） they readily 伝える to those ideas to which they are 関係のある, and which they 似ている. I shall only infer from these practices, and this 推論する／理由ing, that the 影響 of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very ありふれた; and as in every 事例／患者 a resemblance and a 現在の impression must 同意する, we are abundantly 供給（する）d with 実験s to 証明する the reality of the foregoing 原則.

42. We may 追加する 軍隊 to these 実験s by others of a different 肉親，親類d, in considering the 影響s of contiguity 同様に as of resemblance. It is 確かな that distance 減らすs the 軍隊 of every idea, and that, upon our approach to any 反対する, though it does not discover itself to our senses it operates upon the mind with an 影響（力）, which imitates an 即座の impression. The thinking on any 反対する readily 輸送（する）s the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an 反対する, that 輸送（する）s it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that distance the 反映するing on anything in the neighbourhood of my friends or family 自然に produces an idea of them. But as in this latter 事例／患者, both the 反対するs of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is an 平易な 移行 between them; that 移行 alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some 即座の impression.*
[* "Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui 非，不，無 memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam dico, 非，不，無 hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in locis; ut 非，不，無 sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit disciplina."
Cicero, De finibus, 調書をとる／予約する V. ]

43. No one can 疑問 but causation has the same 影響（力） as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and 宗教上の men, for the same 推論する／理由, that they 捜し出す after types or images, ーするために enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those 模範的な lives, which they 願望（する） to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the best reliques, which a 充てる could procure, would be the handywork of a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it is because they were once at his 処分, and were moved and 影響する／感情d by him; in which 尊敬（する）・点 they are to be considered as imperfect 影響s, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his 存在.

Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, were 現在のd to us; it is evident, that this 反対する would 即時に 生き返らせる its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would さもなければ have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems to 証明する the 原則 above について言及するd.

44. We may 観察する, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the correlative 反対する is always presupposed; without which the relation could have no 影響. The 影響（力） of the picture supposes, that we believe our friend to have once 存在するd. Continguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we believe that it really 存在するs. Now I 主張する, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a 類似の nature, and arises from 類似の 原因（となる）s, with the 移行 of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of 乾燥した，日照りの 支持を得ようと努めるd into a 解雇する／砲火／射撃, my mind is すぐに carried to conceive, that it augments, not 消滅させるs the 炎上. This 移行 of thought from the 原因（となる） to the 影響 proceeds not from 推論する／理由. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an 反対する, 現在の to the senses, it （判決などを）下すs the idea or conception of 炎上 more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises すぐに. The thought moves 即時に に向かって it, and 伝えるs to it all that 軍隊 of conception, which is derived from the impression 現在の to the senses. When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of 負傷させる and 苦痛 strike me more 堅固に, than when a glass of ワイン is 現在のd to me, even though by 事故 this idea should occur after the 外見 of the latter 反対する? But what is there in this whole 事柄 to 原因（となる） such a strong conception, except only a 現在の 反対する and a customary 移行 to the idea of another 反対する, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole 操作／手術 of the mind, in all our 結論s 関心ing 事柄 of fact and 存在; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The 移行 from a 現在の 反対する does in all 事例／患者s give strength and solidity to the 関係のある idea.

Here, then, is a 肉親，親類d of pre-設立するd harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the 力／強力にするs and 軍隊s, by which the former is 治める／統治するd, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other 作品 of nature. Custom is that 原則, by which this correspondence has been 影響d; so necessary to the subsistence of our 種類, and the 規則 of our 行為／行う, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an 反対する, 即時に excited the idea of those 反対するs, 一般的に conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been 限られた／立憲的な to the 狭くする sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or 雇う our natural 力／強力にするs, either to the producing of good, or 避けるing of evil. Those, who delight in the 発見 and contemplation of final 原因（となる）s, have here ample 支配する to 雇う their wonder and 賞賛.

45. I shall 追加する, for a その上の 確定／確認 of the foregoing theory, that, as this 操作／手術 of the mind, by which we infer like 影響s from like 原因（となる）s, and 副／悪徳行為 versa, is so 必須の to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be 信用d to the fallacious deductions of our 推論する／理由, which is slow in its 操作／手術s; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of 幼少／幼藍期; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, 極端に liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary 知恵 of nature to 安全な・保証する so necessary an 行為／法令／行動する of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical 傾向, which may be infallible in its 操作／手術s, may discover itself at the first 外見 of life and thought, and may be 独立した・無所属 of all the 労働d deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our 四肢s, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and 神経s, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries 今後 the thought in a 特派員 course to that which she has 設立するd の中で 外部の 反対するs; though we are ignorant of those 力／強力にするs and 軍隊s, on which this 正規の／正選手 course and succession of 反対するs 全く depends.

Sect. VI. Of Probability*

46. THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real 原因（となる） of any event has the same 影響（力） on the understanding, and begets a like 種類 of belief or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a 優越 of chances on any 味方する; and （許可，名誉などを）与えるing as this 優越 encreases, and より勝るs the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that 味方する, in which we discover the 優越. If a die were 示すd with one 人物／姿／数字 or number of 位置／汚点／見つけ出すs on four 味方するs, and with another 人物／姿／数字 or number of 位置／汚点／見つけ出すs on the two remaining 味方するs, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand 味方するs 示すd in the same manner, and only one 味方する different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or 期待 of the event more 安定した and 安全な・保証する. This 過程 of the thought or 推論する／理由ing may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it more 辛うじて, it may, perhaps, afford 事柄 for curious 憶測.

It seems evident, that, when the mind looks 今後 to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a die, it considers the turning up of each particular 味方する as alike probable; and this the very nature of chance, to （判決などを）下す all the particular events, comprehended in it, 完全に equal. But finding a greater number of 味方するs 同意する in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event, and 会合，会うs it oftener, in 回転するing the さまざまな 可能性s or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several 見解（をとる）s in one particular event begets すぐに, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the 感情 of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a smaller number of 見解（をとる）s, and recurs いっそう少なく frequently to the mind. If we 許す, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an 反対する than what …に出席するs the mere fictions of the imagination, this 操作／手術 may, perhaps, in some 手段, be accounted for. The concurrence of these several 見解（をとる）s or glimpses imprints the idea more 堅固に on the imagination; gives it superior 軍隊 and vigour; （判決などを）下すs its 影響（力） on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that 依存 or 安全, which 構成するs the nature of belief and opinion.

47. The 事例／患者 is the same with the probability of 原因（となる）s, as with that of chance. There are some 原因（となる）s, which are 完全に uniform and constant in producing a particular 影響; and no instance has ever yet been 設立する of any 失敗 or 不正行為 in their 操作／手術. 解雇する／砲火／射撃 has always 燃やすd, and water 窒息させるd every human creature: The 生産／産物 of 動議 by impulse and gravity is an 全世界の／万国共通の 法律, which has hitherto 認める of no exception. But there are other 原因（となる）s, which have been 設立する more 不規律な and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always 証明するd a 粛清する, or あへん a soporific to every one, who has taken these 薬／医学s. It is true, when any 原因（となる） fails of producing its usual 影響, philosophers ascribe not this to any 不正行為 in nature; but suppose, that some secret 原因（となる）s, in the particular structure of parts, have 妨げるd the 操作／手術. Our reasonings, however, and 結論s 関心ing the event are the same as if this 原則 had no place. 存在 決定するd by custom to 移転 the past to the 未来, in all our inferences; where the past has been 完全に 正規の／正選手 and uniform, we 推定する／予想する the event with the greatest 保証／確信, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different 影響s have been 設立する to follow from 原因（となる）s, which are to 外見 正確に／まさに 類似の, all these さまざまな 影響s must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the 未来, and enter into our consideration, when we 決定する the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which has been 設立する most usual, and believe that this 影響 will 存在する, we must not overlook the other 影響s, but must 割り当てる to each of them a particular 負わせる and 当局, in 割合 as we have 設立する it to be more or いっそう少なく たびたび（訪れる）. It is more probable, in almost every country of Europe, that there will be 霜 いつか in January, than that the 天候 will continue open throughout that whole month; though this probability 変化させるs によれば the different 気候s, and approaches t o a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we 移転 the past to the 未来, ーするために 決定する the 影響, which will result from any 原因（となる）, we 移転 all the different events, in the same 割合 as they have appeared in the past, and conceive one to have 存在するd a hundred times, for instance, another ten times, and another once. As a 広大な／多数の／重要な number of 見解（をとる）s do here 同意する in one event, they 防備を堅める／強化する and 確認する it to the imagination, beget that 感情 which we call belief, and give its 反対する the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of 実験s, and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the 未来. Let any one try to account for this 操作／手術 of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall think it 十分な, if the 現在の hints excite the curiosity of philosophers, and make them sensible how 欠陥のある all ありふれた theories are in 扱う／治療するing of such curious and such sublime 支配するs.

Sect. VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion

Part I.

One may 安全に, however, 断言する, that, if we consider these sciences in a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly 補償する each other, and 減ずる both of them to a 明言する／公表する of equality. If the mind, with greater 施設, 保持するs the ideas of geometry （疑いを）晴らす and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of 推論する／理由ing, and compare ideas much wider of each other, ーするために reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to 落ちる into obscurity and 混乱, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the 中間の steps, which lead to the 結論, much より小数の than in the sciences which 扱う／治療する of 量 and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of more parts, than are to be 設立する in any moral 推論する／理由ing which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the 原則s of the human mind through a few steps, we may be very 井戸／弁護士席 満足させるd with our 進歩; considering how soon nature throws a 妨げる／法廷，弁護士業 to all our enquiries 関心ing 原因（となる）s, and 減ずるs us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The 長，指導者 障害, therefore, to our 改良 in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the 条件. The 主要な／長／主犯 difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any 結論. And, perhaps, our 進歩 in natural philosophy is 主として retarded by the want of proper 実験s and phaenomena, which are often discovered by chance, and cannot always be 設立する, when requisite, even by the most diligent and 慎重な enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received いっそう少なく 改良 than either geometry or physics, we may 結論する, that, if there be any difference in this 尊敬（する）・点 の中で these sciences, the difficulties, which 妨害する the 進歩 of the former, 要求する superior care and capacity to be surmounted.

49. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of 力／強力にする, 軍隊, energy or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to 扱う／治療する in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to 直す／買収する，八百長をする, if possible, the 正確な meaning of these 条件, and その為に 除去する some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this 種類 of philosophy.

It seems a proposition, which will not 収容する／認める of much 論争, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our 外部の or 内部の senses. I have endeavoured* to explain and 証明する this proposition, and have 表明するd my hopes, that, by a proper 使用／適用 of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to 達成する. コンビナート／複合体 ideas may, perhaps, be 井戸／弁護士席 known by 鮮明度／定義, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have 押し進めるd up 鮮明度／定義s to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what 資源 are we then 所有するd of? By what 発明 can we throw light upon these ideas, and （判決などを）下す them altogether 正確な and determinate to our 知識人 見解（をとる）? Produce the impressions or 初めの 感情s, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They 収容する／認める not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a 十分な light themselves, but may throw light on their 特派員 ideas, which 嘘（をつく） in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, 達成する a new microscope or 種類 of 視覚のs, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so 大きくするd as to 落ちる readily under our 逮捕, and be 平等に known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the 反対する of our enquiry.
[* Section II.]

50. To be fully 熟知させるd, therefore, with the idea of 力／強力にする or necessary connexion, let us 診察する its impression; and ーするために find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may かもしれない be derived.

When we look about us に向かって 外部の 反対するs, and consider the 操作／手術 of 原因（となる）s, we are never able, in a 選び出す／独身 instance, to discover any 力／強力にする or necessary connexion; any 質, which 貯蔵所d the 影響 to the 原因（となる）, and （判決などを）下すs the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does 現実に, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is …に出席するd with 動議 in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no 感情 or inward impression from this succession of 反対するs: その結果, there is not, in any 選び出す／独身, particular instance of 原因（となる） and 影響, anything which can 示唆する the idea of 力／強力にする or necessary connexion.

From the first 外見 of an 反対する, we never can conjecture what 影響 will result from it. But were the 力／強力にする or energy of any 原因（となる） discoverable by the mind, we could 予知する the 影響, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty 関心ing it, by mere dint of thought and 推論する／理由ing.

In reality, there is no part of 事柄, that does ever, by its sensible 質s, discover any 力／強力にする or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other 反対する, which we could denominate its 影響. Solidity, 拡張, 動議; these 質s are all 完全にする in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually 転換ing, and one 反対する follows another in an 連続する succession; but the 力／強力にする of 軍隊, which actuates the whole machine, is 完全に 隠すd from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible 質s of 団体／死体. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of 炎上; but what is the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of 力／強力にする can be derived from the contemplation of 団体／死体s, in 選び出す／独身 instances of their 操作／手術; because no 団体／死体s ever discover any 力／強力にする, which can be the 初めの of this idea.*
[* Mr. Locke, in his 一時期／支部 of 力／強力にする, says that, finding from experience, that there are several new 生産／産物s in 事柄, and 結論するing that there must somewhere be a 力／強力にする 有能な of producing them, we arrive at last by this 推論する／理由ing at the idea of 力／強力にする. But no 推論する／理由ing can ever give us a new, 初めの, simple idea; as this philosopher himself 自白するs. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.]

51. Since, therefore, 外部の 反対するs as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of 力／強力にする or necessary connexion, by their 操作／手術 in particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the 操作／手術s of our own minds, and be copied from any 内部の impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of 内部の 力／強力にする; while we feel, that, by the simple 命令（する） of our will, we can move the 組織／臓器s of our 団体／死体, or direct the faculties of our mind. An 行為／法令／行動する of volition produces 動議 in our 四肢s, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This 影響（力） of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of 力／強力にする or energy; and are 確かな , that we ourselves and all other intelligent 存在s are 所有するd of 力／強力にする. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from 反映するing on the 操作／手術s of our own mind, and on the 命令（する） which is 演習d by will, both over the 組織／臓器s of the 団体／死体 and faculties of the soul.

52. We shall proceed to 診察する this pretension; and first with regard to the 影響（力） of volition over the 組織／臓器s of the 団体／死体. This 影響（力）, we may 観察する, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only be experience, and can never be foreseen from any 明らかな energy or 力／強力にする in the 原因（となる）, which connects it with the 影響, and （判決などを）下すs the one an infallible consequence of the other. The 動議 of our 団体／死体 follows upon the 命令（する） of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is 影響d; the energy, by which the will 成し遂げるs so 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の an 操作／手術; of this we are so far from 存在 すぐに conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry.

For first; is there any 原則 in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with 団体／死体; by which a supposed spiritual 実体 acquires such an 影響（力） over a 構成要素 one, that the most 精製するd thought is able to actuate the grossest 事柄? Were we 権力を与えるd, by a secret wish, to 除去する mountains, or 支配（する）／統制する the 惑星s in their 軌道; this 広範囲にわたる 当局 would not be more 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の, nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any 力／強力にする or energy in the will, we must know this 力／強力にする; we must know its connexion with the 影響; we must know the secret union of soul and 団体／死体, and the nature of both these 実体s; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the other.

Secondly, We are not able to move all the 組織／臓器s of the 団体／死体 with a like 当局; though we cannot 割り当てる any 推論する／理由 besides experience, for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an 影響（力） over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or 肝臓? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a 力／強力にする in the former 事例／患者, not in the latter. We should then perceive, 独立した・無所属 of experience, why the 当局 of will over the 組織／臓器s of the 団体／死体 is circumscribed within such particular 限界s. 存在 in that 事例／患者 fully 熟知させるd with the 力／強力にする or 軍隊, by which it operates, we should also know, why its 影響（力） reaches 正確に to such 境界s, and no さらに先に.

A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the 脚 or arm, or who had newly lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them, and 雇う them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of 力／強力にする to 命令（する） such 四肢s, as a man in perfect health is conscious of 力／強力にする to actuate any member which remains in its natural 明言する／公表する and 条件. But consciousness never deceives. その結果, neither in the one 事例／患者 nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any 力／強力にする. We learn the 影響（力） of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event 絶えず follows another; without 教えるing us in the secret connexion, which 貯蔵所d them together, and （判決などを）下すs them inseparable.

Thirdly, We learn from anatomy, that the 即座の 反対する of 力／強力にする in voluntary 動議, is not the member itself which is moved, but 確かな muscles, and 神経s, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown, through which the 動議 is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose 動議 is the 即座の 反対する of volition. Can there be a more 確かな proof, that the 力／強力にする, by which this whole 操作／手術 is 成し遂げるd, so far from 存在 直接／まっすぐに and fully known by an inward 感情 or consciousness, is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a 確かな event: すぐに another event, unknown to ourselves, and 全く different from the one ーするつもりであるd, is produced: This event produces another, 平等に unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the 願望（する）d event is produced. But if the 初めの 力／強力にする were felt, it must be known: Were it known, its 影響 also must be known; since all 力／強力にする is 親族 to its 影響. And 副／悪徳行為 versa, if the 影響 be not known, the 力／強力にする cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a 力／強力にする to move our 四肢s, when we have no such 力／強力にする; but only that to move 確かな animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the 動議 of our 四肢s, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension?

We may, therefore, 結論する from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with 保証／確信; that our idea of 力／強力にする is not copied from any 感情 or consciousness of 力／強力にする within ourselves, when we give rise to animal 動議, or 適用する our 四肢s to their proper use and office. That their 動議 follows the 命令（する） of the will is a 事柄 of ありふれた experience, like other natural events: But the 力／強力にする or energy by which this is 影響d, like that in other natural events, is unknown and 信じられない.*
[* It may be pretended, that the 抵抗 which we 会合，会う with in 団体／死体s, 強いるing us frequently to 発揮する our 軍隊, and call up all our 力／強力にする, this gives us the idea of 軍隊 and 力／強力にする. It is this nisus, or strong endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the 初めの impression from which this idea is copied. But, first, we せいにする 力／強力にする to a 広大な number of 反対するs, where we never can suppose this 抵抗 of exertion of 軍隊 to take place; to the 最高の 存在, who never 会合，会うs with any 抵抗; to the mind in its 命令（する） over its ideas and 四肢s, in ありふれた thinking and 動議, where the 影響 follows すぐに upon the will, without any exertion or 召喚するing up of 軍隊; to inanimate 事柄, which is not 有能な of this 感情. Secondly, This 感情 of an endeavour to 打ち勝つ 抵抗 has no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it a priori. It must, however, be 自白するd, that the animal nisus, which we experience, though it can afford no 正確な 正確な idea of 力／強力にする, enters very much into that vulgar, 不確かの idea, which is formed of it.]

53. Shall we then 主張する, that we are conscious of a 力／強力にする or energy in our own minds, when, by an 行為／法令／行動する or 命令（する） of our will, we raise up a new idea, 直す／買収する，八百長をする the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all 味方するs, and at last 解任する it for some other idea, when we think that we have 調査するd it with 十分な 正確? I believe the same arguments will 証明する, that even this 命令（する） of the will gives us no real idea of 軍隊 or energy.

First, It must be 許すd, that, when we know a 力／強力にする, we know that very circumstance in the 原因（となる）, by which it is enabled to produce the 影響: For these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, therefore, know both the 原因（となる） and 影響, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be 熟知させるd with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real 創造; a 生産／産物 of something out of nothing: Which 暗示するs a 力／強力にする so 広大な／多数の／重要な, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the reach of any 存在, いっそう少なく than infinite. At least it must be owned, that such a 力／強力にする is not felt, nor known, nor even 考えられる by the mind. We only feel the event, すなわち, the 存在 of an idea, consequent to a 命令（する） of the will: But the manner, in which this 操作／手術 is 成し遂げるd, the 力／強力にする by which it is produced, is 完全に beyond our comprehension.

Secondly, The 命令（する） of the mind over itself is 限られた／立憲的な, 同様に as its 命令（する） over the 団体／死体; and these 限界s are not known by 推論する／理由, or any 知識 with the nature of 原因（となる） and 影響, but only by experience and 観察, as in all other natural events and in the 操作／手術 of 外部の 反対するs. Our 当局 over our 感情s and passions is much 女性 than that over our ideas; and even the latter 当局 is circumscribed within very 狭くする 境界s. Will any one pretend to 割り当てる the ultimate 推論する／理由 of these 境界s, or show why the 力／強力にする is deficient in one 事例／患者, not in another.

Thirdly, This self-命令（する） is very different at different times. A man in health 所有するs more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: 急速な／放蕩なing, than after a 十分な meal. Can we give any 推論する／理由 for these variations, except experience? Where then is the 力／強力にする, of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or 構成要素 実体, or both, some secret 機械装置 or structure of parts, upon which the 影響 depends, and which, 存在 完全に unknown to us, （判決などを）下すs the 力／強力にする or energy of the will 平等に unknown and 理解できない?

Volition is surely an 行為／法令／行動する of the mind, with which we are 十分に 熟知させるd. 反映する upon it. Consider it on all 味方するs. Do you find anything in it like this creative 力／強力にする, by which it raises from nothing a new idea, and with a 肉親，親類d of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its 製造者, if I may be 許すd so to speak, who called 前へ／外へ into 存在 all the さまざまな scenes of nature? So far from 存在 conscious of this energy in the will, it 要求するs as 確かな experience as that of which we are 所有するd, to 納得させる us that such 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の 影響s do ever result from a simple 行為／法令／行動する of volition.

54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more ありふれた and familiar 操作／手術s of nature- such as the 降下／家系 of 激しい 団体／死体s, the growth of 工場／植物s, the 世代 of animals, or the nourishment of 団体／死体s by food: But suppose that, in all these 事例／患者s, they perceive the very 軍隊 or energy of the 原因（となる）, by which it is connected with its 影響, and is for ever infallible in its 操作／手術. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the 外見 of the 原因（となる）, they すぐに 推定する／予想する with 保証／確信 its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the 発見 of 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の phaenomena, such as 地震s, pestilence, and prodigies of any 肉親，親類d, that they find themselves at a loss to 割り当てる a proper 原因（となる）, and to explain the manner in which the 影響 is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have 頼みの綱 to some invisible intelligent 原則* as the 即座の 原因（となる） of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the ありふれた 力／強力にするs of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little さらに先に, すぐに perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the 原因（となる） is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the たびたび（訪れる） 合同 of 反対するs, without 存在 ever able to comprehend anything like Connexion between them.
[* Theos apo mechanes (deus ex machina).]

55. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves 強いるd by 推論する／理由 to have 頼みの綱, on all occasions, to the same 原則, which the vulgar never 控訴，上告 to but in 事例／患者s that appear miraculous and supernatural. They 認める mind and 知能 to be, not only the ultimate and 初めの 原因（となる） of all things, but the 即座の and 単独の 原因（となる） of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those 反対するs which are 一般的に denominated 原因（となる）s, are in reality nothing but occasions; and that the true and direct 原則 of every 影響 is not any 力／強力にする or 軍隊 in nature, but a volition of the 最高の 存在, who wills that such particular 反対するs should for ever be conjoined with each other. Instead of 説 that one billiard-ball moves another by a 軍隊 which it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, 存在 決定するd to this 操作／手術 by the impulse of the first ball, in consequence of those general 法律s which he has laid 負かす／撃墜する to himself in the 政府 of the universe. But philosophers 前進するing still in their 調査s, discover that, as we are 全く ignorant of the 力／強力にする on which depends the 相互の 操作／手術 of 団体／死体s, we are no いっそう少なく ignorant of that 力／強力にする on which depends the 操作／手術 of mind on 団体／死体, or of 団体／死体 on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to 割り当てる the ultimate 原則 in one 事例／患者 more than in the other. The same ignorance, therefore, 減ずるs them to the same 結論. They 主張する that the Deity is the 即座の 原因（となる） of the union between soul and 団体／死体; and that they are not the 組織／臓器s of sense, which, 存在 agitated by 外部の 反対するs, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent 製造者, which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a 動議 in the 組織／臓器. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces 地元の 動議 in our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second o ur will, in itself impotent, and to 命令（する） that 動議 which we erroneously せいにする to our own 力／強力にする and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this 結論. They いつかs 延長する the same inference to the mind itself, in its 内部の 操作／手術s. Our mental 見通し or conception of ideas is nothing but a 発覚 made to us by our 製造者. When we 任意に turn our thoughts to any 反対する, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the 全世界の／万国共通の Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and （判決などを）下すs it 現在の to us.

56. Thus, によれば these philosophers, every thing is 十分な of God. Not content with the 原則, that nothing 存在するs but by his will, that nothing 所有するs any 力／強力にする but by his 譲歩: They 略奪する nature, and all created 存在s, of every 力／強力にする, ーするために （判決などを）下す their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and 即座の. They consider not that, by this theory, they 減らす, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those せいにするs, which they 影響する／感情 so much to celebrate. It argues surely more 力／強力にする in the Deity to 委任する／代表 a 確かな degree of 力／強力にする to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own 即座の volition. It argues more 知恵 to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by its proper 操作／手術, it may serve all the 目的s of providence, than if the 広大な／多数の／重要な Creator were 強いるd every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.

But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two に引き続いて reflections may 十分である.

57. First, it seems to me that this theory of the 全世界の／万国共通の energy and 操作／手術 of the 最高の 存在 is too bold ever to carry 有罪の判決 with it to a man, 十分に apprized of the 証拠不十分 of human 推論する／理由, and the 狭くする 限界s to which it is 限定するd in all its 操作／手術s. Though the chain of arguments which 行為／行う to it were ever so 論理（学）の, there must arise a strong 疑惑, if not an 絶対の 保証／確信, that it has carried us やめる beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to 結論s so 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の, and so remote from ありふれた life and experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory; and there we have no 推論する／理由 to 信用 our ありふれた methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any 当局. Our line is too short to fathom such 巨大な abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a 肉親，親類d of verisimilitude and experience, we may be 保証するd that this fancied experience has no 当局 when we thus 適用する it to 支配するs that 嘘（をつく） 完全に out of the sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards.*
[* Section XII.]

Secondly, I cannot perceive any 軍隊 in the arguments on which this theory is 設立するd. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which 団体／死体s operate on each other: Their 軍隊 or energy is 完全に 理解できない: But are we not 平等に ignorant of the manner or 軍隊 by which a mind, even the 最高の mind, operates either on itself or on 団体／死体? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no 感情 or consciousness of this 力／強力にする in ourselves. We have no idea of the 最高の 存在 but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good 推論する／理由 for 拒絶するing anything, we should be led into that 原則 of 否定するing all energy in the 最高の 存在 as much as in the grossest 事柄. We surely comprehend as little the 操作／手術s of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive that 動議 may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our 深遠な ignorance in both 事例／患者s.*
[* I need not 診察する at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed to 事柄. We find by experience, that a 団体／死体 at 残り／休憩（する） or in 動議 continues for ever in its 現在の 明言する／公表する, till put from it by some new 原因（となる）; and that a 団体／死体 impelled takes as much 動議 from the impelling 団体／死体 as it acquires itself. These are facts. When we call this a vis inertiae, we only 示す these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert 力／強力にする; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean 確かな 影響s, without comprehending that active 力／強力にする. It was never the meaning of Sir Isaac Newton to 略奪する second 原因（となる）s of all 軍隊 or energy; though some of his 信奉者s have endeavoured to 設立する that theory upon his 当局. On the contrary, that 広大な／多数の／重要な philosopher had 頼みの綱 to an etherial active fluid to explain his 全世界の／万国共通の attraction; though he was so 用心深い and modest as to 許す, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to be 主張するd on, without more 実験s. I must 自白する, that there is something in the 運命／宿命 of opinions a little 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の. Descartes insinuated that doctrine of the 全世界の／万国共通の and 単独の efficacy of the Deity, without 主張するing on it. Malebranche and other Cartesians made it the 創立／基礎 of all their philosophy. It had, however, no 当局 in England. Locke, Clarke, and Cudworth, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all along, that 事柄 has a real, though subordinate and derived 力／強力にする. By what means has it become so 流布している の中で our modern metaphysicians?]

Part II.

59. But there still remains one method of 避けるing this 結論, and one source which we have not yet 診察するd. When any natural 反対する or event is 現在のd, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or 侵入／浸透, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that 反対する which is すぐに 現在の to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or 実験 where we have 観察するd a particular event to follow upon another, we are not する権利を与えるd to form a general 支配する, or foretell what will happen in like 事例／患者s; it 存在 正確に，正当に esteemed an unpardonable temerity to 裁判官 of the whole course of nature from one 選び出す／独身 実験, however 正確な or 確かな . But when one particular 種類 of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no any scruple of foretelling one upon the 外見 of the other, and of 雇うing that 推論する／理由ing, which can alone 保証する us of any 事柄 of fact or 存在. We then call the one 反対する, 原因（となる）; the other, 影響. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some 力／強力にする in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion の中で events arises from a number of 類似の instances which occur of the constant 合同 of these events; nor can that idea ever be 示唆するd by any one of these instances, 調査するd in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every 選び出す／独身 instance, which is supposed to be 正確に／まさに 類似の; except only, that after a repetition of 類似の instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the 外見 of one event, to 推定する／予想する its usual attendant, and to believe that it will 存在する. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary 移行 of the imagination from one 反対する to its usual attendant, is the 感情 or impression from which we form the idea of 力／強力にする or necessary connexion. Nothing さらに先に is in the 事例／患者. 熟視する／熟考する the 支配する on all 味方するs; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the 単独の difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of 類似の instances, by which it is 示唆するd. The first time a man saw the communication of 動議 by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has 観察するd several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the 存在 of one from the 外見 of the other. When we say, therefore, that one 反対する is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's 存在: A 結論 which is somewhat 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の, but which seems 設立するd on 十分な 証拠. Nor will its 証拠 be 弱めるd by any general diffidence of the understandin g, or 懐疑的な 疑惑 関心ing every 結論 which is new and 驚くべき／特命の／臨時の. No 結論s can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make 発見s 関心ing the 証拠不十分 and 狭くする 限界s of human 推論する／理由 and capacity.

60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and 証拠不十分 of the understanding than the 現在の? For surely, if there be any relation の中で 反対するs which it 輸入するs to us to know perfectly, it is that of 原因（となる） and 影響. On this are 設立するd all our reasonings 関心ing 事柄 of fact or 存在. By means of it alone we 達成する any 保証／確信 関心ing 反対するs which are 除去するd from the 現在の 証言 of our memory and senses. The only 即座の 公共事業（料金）／有用性 of all sciences, is to teach us, how to 支配（する）／統制する and 規制する 未来 events by their 原因（となる）s. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, 雇うd about this relation: Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form 関心ing it, that it is impossible to give any just 鮮明度／定義 of 原因（となる）, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. 類似の 反対するs are always conjoined with 類似の. Of this we have experience. 都合よく to this experience, therefore, we may define a 原因（となる） to be an 反対する, followed by another, and where all the 反対するs 類似の to the first are followed by 反対するs 類似の to the second. Or in other words where, if the first 反対する had not been, the second never had 存在するd. The 外見 of a 原因（となる） always 伝えるs the mind, by a customary 移行, to the idea of the 影響. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, 都合よく to this experience, form another 鮮明度／定義 of 原因（となる）, and call it, an 反対する followed by another, and whose 外見 always 伝えるs the thought to that other. But though both these 鮮明度／定義s be drawn from circumstances foreign to the 原因（となる）, we cannot 治療（薬） this inconvenience, or 達成する any more perfect 鮮明度／定義, which may point out that circumstance in the 原因（となる）, which gives it a connexion with its 影響. We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any 際立った notion what it is we 願望（する） to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the 原因（となる） of this particular soun d. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all 類似の vibrations have been followed by 類似の sounds: Or, that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the 外見 of one the mind 心配するs the senses, and forms すぐに an idea of the other. We may consider the relation of 原因（となる） and 影響 in either of these two lights; but beyond these, we have no idea of it.*
[* によれば these explications and 鮮明度／定義s, the idea of 力／強力にする is 親族 as much as that of 原因（となる）; and both have a 言及／関連 to an 影響, or some other event 絶えず conjoined with the former. When we consider the unknown circumstance of an 反対する, by which the degree or 量 of its 影響 is 直す／買収する，八百長をするd and 決定するd, we call that its 力／強力にする: And accordingly, it is 許すd by all philosophers, that the 影響 is the 手段 of the 力／強力にする. But if they had any idea of 力／強力にする, as it is in itself, why could not they 手段 it in itself? The 論争 whether the 軍隊 of a 団体／死体 in 動議 be as its velocity, or the square of its velocity; this 論争, I say, need not be decided by comparing its 影響s in equal or unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison.]

As to the たびたび（訪れる） use of the words, 軍隊, 力／強力にする, Energy, &c., which every where occur in ありふれた conversation, 同様に as in philosophy; that is no proof, that we are 熟知させるd, in any instance, with the connecting 原則 between 原因（となる） and 影響, or can account 最終的に for the 生産／産物 of one thing to another. These words, as 一般的に used, have very loose meanings 別館d to them; and their ideas are very uncertain and 混乱させるd. No animal can put 外部の 団体／死体s in 動議 without the 感情 of a nisus or endeavour; and every animal has a 感情 or feeling from the 一打／打撃 or blow of an 外部の 反対する that is in 動議. These sensations, which are 単に animal, and from which we can a priori draw no inference, we are apt to 移転 to inanimate 反対するs, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they 移転 or receive 動議. With regard to energies, which are 発揮するd, without our 別館ing to them any idea of communicated 動議, we consider only the constant experienced 合同 of the events; and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas, we 移転 that feeling to the 反対するs; as nothing is more usual than to 適用する to 外部の 団体／死体s every 内部の sensation, which they occasion.

61. To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every idea is copied from some 先行する impression or 感情; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be 確かな that there is no idea. In all 選び出す／独身 instances of the 操作／手術 of 団体／死体s or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor その結果 can 示唆する any idea of 力／強力にする or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same 反対する is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of 原因（となる） and connexion. We then feel a new 感情 or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one 反対する and its usual attendant; and this 感情 is the 初めの of that idea which we 捜し出す for. For as this idea arises from a number of 類似の instances, and not from any 選び出す／独身 instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of instances 異なる from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or 移行 of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they 異なる. In every other particular they are alike. The first instance which we saw of 動議 communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is 正確に／まさに 類似の to any instance that may, at 現在の, occur to us; except only, that we could not, at first, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at 現在の, after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this 推論する／理由ing. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of 見解（をとる） which, if we can happily 攻撃する，衝突する, we shall go さらに先に に向かって illustrating the 支配する than by all the eloquence and copious 表現 in the world. This point of 見解（をとる） we should endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for 支配するs which are more adapted to them.

[Continued in とじ込み／提出する 2]